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General Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The common theme is the
analysis of the role that endogenous and strategic participation decisions play form-
ing market structure and the design of regulatory policy that takes such responses
into account.
The first two chapters are concerned with the effects of vertical restraints in the
entry and brand positioning by dealerships in the car retail industry. In Chapter
1, I look at the effects of exclusive dealing and analyze whether car manufacturers
use exclusivity with foreclosing motives. In Chapter 2, I explore the consequences
of allowing for territorial protections in the formation of retail networks.
The third part of this dissertation is co-authored with Hidenori Takahashi and
Yuya Takahashi. In Chapter 3, we study participation decisions in the procure-
ment of public infrastructure project. We analyze the role that information about
potential entry has coordinating entry among firms.
In what follows, I present summaries of the chapters.
Chapter 1
Downstream Competition and Exclusive Dealing
In this chapter, I empirically investigate the role of downstream competition in
the use of exclusive dealing and quantify its effects in the formation of the car
retailing networks. For this purpose, I develop and estimate a structural model
where exclusivity can impact both supply and demand to be able to capture the
diverse channels through which exclusive dealing plays a role.
In innovation to the previous literature, I allow dealers to choose which brand to
offer strategically. These participation choices frame product and brand availability
in the market and the retail networks for manufacturers. Dealers face a trade-off
in this framework. They have incentives to add more brands to sell a broader set
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of products, but their interest to differentiate from local rivals limits this option.
Moreover, manufacturers could raise costs anticompetitively to deter dealers from
selling products of rival brands and foreclosing them.
I estimate the demand parameters, marginal costs, and fixed costs of the model in
three stages. In my econometric estimation, I introduce a strategy to circumvent the
selection issue that arises when using outcome data to form moment inequalities.
I analyze the potential for upstream foreclosure, comparing the estimated fixed
costs between exclusive and non-exclusive stores. I find that multi-dealing has an
average cost advantage between -e 10,000 and e 620,000. These numbers indicate
that downstream competition, instead of anticompetitive motives, explains a more
substantial part of the prevalence of exclusive dealing in the market.
Chapter 2
Exclusive Territories and Brand Proliferation: A
Simulation Study
In this chapter, I extend the model from the previous chapter to perform a simulation
analysis. I investigate the role that territorial restrictions play in brand offerings
in the car retail industry when combined with exclusive dealing. I experiment with
the effects of implementing a policy by which dealers of the same brand cannot be
closer than a certain distance from each other.
In particular, I look at whether forcefully spacing out intra-brand competition
would give incentives for dealerships to substitute selling product from larger to
smaller manufacturers. This scenario would lead to better access to points of sale by
small competitors and higher product variety. Alternatively, territorial restrictions
could reduce global competition without retailers substituting brands, and harming
consumer welfare.
I find that, while territorial restrictions decrease the number of dealerships for
larger manufacturers, it does not incentivize them to replace them with smaller
manufacturers. Moreover, it causes an overall reduction in the number of dealers
in the market that is detrimental to consumers. These patterns indicate that the
current limits to the use of exclusive territories in the car retail market are a right
regulatory approach, and its repeal would be positive neither for consumers nor for
small manufacturers.
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Chapter 3
Entry Signal and Market Segregation
This chapter is joint work with Hidenori Takahashi and Yuya Takahashi. In it, we
examine the role of information design in procurement auctions using data from
transport infrastructure projects in Florida.
In our setup, the procurer requires that interested firms request for a construction
plan to participate in an auction. Plan requests become common knowledge before
the auction takes place. We use this institutional feature to examine the impact
of disclosing the number and identity of interested bidders on bidders’ behavior
and auction outcomes. We are interested in whether this institutional design leads
strong contractors to signal their intention to bid for projects and preempt the entry
of smaller firms to their advantage.
We find that the potential entry of an additional strong firm reduces the prob-
ability of participation of weak rivals by a 2.7%. We suspect that the signaling is
a result of contractors substitution across projects. We find that each additional
participation raises a strong firm’s bid by 1% and a weak firm’s bid by 3.8%.
3
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Chapter 1
Downstream Competition and
Exclusive Dealing
1.1 Introduction
Despite attempts by the competition authorities to encourage car retail outlets to
sell more than one brand, multi-brand dealerships are a rarity in Europe1. Manu-
facturers often force their retailers to sell other brands under dedicated corporate
identities using separate showrooms and with different personnel. These require-
ments increase the costs of multi-brand dealing and deter retailers from taking such
options. However, multi-dealing reduces the incentives for manufacturers to invest
in their retail stores, especially with respect to marketing and brand image. This is
an important consideration, as investments in promotional efforts can be substan-
tial: for example, in the case of car retailing, in Spain alone, they account for 13.4%
of total sales revenue.
In this paper, I study how the presence of exclusive contracts shapes the com-
petition between retailers from an empirical perspective. On the one hand, it can
be in the interest of the retailer and the manufacturer to sign exclusive dealing
agreements in order to preserve the returns from investments in brand promotional
activities (Besanko and Perry, 1993), and differentiate from competing retailers (Be-
sanko and Perry, 1994). On the other hand, the manufacturer may use exclusivity
to soften competition by raising the retailers’ costs to offer other brands2. In par-
1MEMO 10/217 by the European Commission: “The old rules have had little impact on favour-
ing multi-dealerships, which continue to be determined by the size of the dealers and their geo-
graphical location – multi dealerships are more likely to happen in remote areas and within large
dealer groups that have buyer power.”
2Anticompetitive motives for exclusive dealing have been addressed extensively. E.g., Aghion
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ticular, I assess the question of whether the prevalence of exclusive dealing between
manufacturers and retailers emerges as a result of competition shaping the mar-
ket or whether there is a scope for manufacturers to indirectly deter intra-dealer
competition by increasing the costs for dealerships to sell for other brands.
The existing empirical literature has studied these two forces in isolation. More
specifically, Asker (2016) looks at the possibility that exclusive dealing gives rise
to foreclosure of competing brands, while Nurski and Verboven (2016) study the
role of exclusivity as a means to achieve higher demand for the retailer. However,
only a combined analysis can help competition authorities to quantify the merits of
exclusive contracts.
I estimate a structural model of demand and supply of the car retail market that
quantifies the diverse effects of exclusivity. Including both sides of the empirical
model to analyze exclusivity helps to construct a full picture for regulation of this
kind of vertical restrictions. On the one hand, only modeling demand misses the
potential effects of exclusive contracts endogenously shaping market structure for
distribution. On the other hand, focusing on capturing supply differences in retail
between exclusive and non-exclusive dealers does not allow for other motivations for
exclusive dealing other than excluding rivals. My results indicate that downstream
competition, instead of anticompetitive motives, explains a more substantial part of
the prevalence of exclusivity in the car distribution market.
There are several challenges associated with this exercise. First, in order to
estimate a model where exclusive dealing impacts both supply and demand, I require
data on (i) car sales registrations, (ii) dealer locations, (iii) brands sold at each
dealer, as well as (iv) demographics of consumers. I collected this information
by combining existing sources with comprehensive self-collected data. The main
difficulty in constructing these data was to distinguish and classify multi-dealerships
and exclusive dealers since many appeared to be disguised under separate showrooms
and names. To address this ambiguity, I define a firm as a multi-dealer when it has
adjacent showrooms which belong to the same owner. These classification efforts
resulted in a novel dataset, whose features I discuss in detail shortly.
Second, I model retailers’ choices of which brands to offer, making my empirical
framework the first one to include such a feature. I use these firm choices to uncover
the fixed costs of operating a dealership. Specifically, following a similar principle to
that of Asker (2016), I compare the estimated costs of exclusive and non-exclusive
dealerships to estimate the difference in the costs of signing such arrangements for
and Bolton (1987), Rasmussen et al. (1991), Segal and Whinston (1996), Bernheim and Whinston
(1998), or Calzolari and Denicolo` (2015)
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the retailers. These costs arise when it is more costly to establish a dealer selling
more than one brand than a dealer selling each of these brands separately.
Similarly to entry games, local competition across dealers leads to a multiplicity
of equilibria of the simultaneous move game in which retailers decide what brands to
deal for, making maximum likelihood methods unfeasible for estimation. I estimate
bounds to fixed costs using moment inequalities defined by equilibrium play (Pakes,
2010; Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii, 2015) and methods developed to draw inference in
these cases (Andrews and Soares, 2010). This approach enables me to overcome the
problem of multiplicity at the cost of losing point identification of the parameters.
Another challenge related to the use of moment inequalities and equilibrium
play for estimation is selection on unobservables. This problem arises when one
makes inference based on observed choices to estimate fixed costs. In particular,
when estimating fixed costs of selling for a particular brand, the upper bounds are
identified by those dealers selling for that brand and the lower bounds by those who
do not. Using this principle alone yields biased estimates since the dealers selling
a particular brand most likely have better (lower) fixed costs than the dealers not
selling it. The resulting (biased) estimates present themselves in the form of upper
bounds for the parameters that are too low and lower bounds that are too high.
Therefore, the estimated sets may not contain the true parameters.
A methodological contribution of this paper, then, is to introduce a strategy
to deal with the selection problem that arises in these situations. The approach I
propose is grounded on the observation that, conditional on observables, equilibrium
play by dealers reflects their need to differentiate from neighboring rivals, and on the
fact that these equilibrium choices are likely to replicate permuting brand offerings
across dealers. The intuition is that the differentiation between dealers within a local
market is a stable equilibrium prediction, and not which dealer sells what brand.
Based on this idea, I propose conditions under which I can create new inequalities
using multiple perturbations from equilibrium play. These inequalities allow me to
derive moment conditions that are not dependent on choice and hence are free from
selection.
In my empirical model, exclusive dealing comes into play in three ways. First,
it enters the demand as a parameter in the consumers’ utility of purchasing a car.
This parameter captures enhanced consumer experience owing to improved customer
service or better promotion. Second, multi-dealing enters the fixed costs paid by
dealers as a cost shifter that I estimate. This parameter captures potential addi-
tional costs (or costs savings) related to selling for more than one brand. Finally,
the choices of whether to deal exclusively are endogenous to the model, meaning
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that these decisions take the effects above into account, as well as the competitive
environment in the market.
The demand framework has similar characteristics to the one in Nurski and Ver-
boven (2016), where dealers differentiate from each other spatially, and exclusive
contracts enter demand as a product characteristic. This demand shifter repre-
sents a taste for exclusivity, due to premium service or additional promotional and
retailing efforts.
As mentioned above, I complete the model by allowing retailers to endogenously
choose their brand offerings in a simultaneous move game setup. On the one hand,
retailers want to differentiate from each other by offering different products to deal-
ers geographically close. On the other hand, they want to sell popular products.
Moreover, in the case of manufacturers raising costs of multi-dealing, exclusive deal-
ing may appeal to downstream competitors because of its lower fixed costs.
In environments without intense competition, exclusive dealing has the effect
of limiting the variety of products offered and narrowing demand for the retailer.
Nevertheless, in the presence of fierce competition, single branding permits dif-
ferentiation across smaller dealers. This interaction between spatial and product
differentiation downstream is internalized by manufacturers, who set product prices
in accordance with their distribution networks. Exclusive dealing eliminates com-
petition among products of different brands within a retailer.
There is a longstanding debate about exclusive dealing contracts in competition
policy because of their potential foreclosing effects. This controversy had its start
in the literature with Posner (1976) and Bork (1978), whose work concluded that
exclusive contracts could not deter entry from a more efficient competitor. My
paper relates to the vast and rich theoretical literature that developed trying to
refute this view. The main takeaway of this literature is that, although contracts
of this kind might have exclusionary effects, their existence can be beneficial, by
boosting investment and retailing efforts3.
There is also growing literature on the empirics of exclusive dealing. My work
links most directly to two papers in this literature and complements them. Asker
(2016) develops a foreclosure test for the beer market in Chicago. He uses demand
estimates and prices to infer distribution costs for brewers. He compares these costs
3Apart from the previously mentioned papers, Fumagalli and Motta (2006), and Simpson and
Wickelgreen (2007) introduce the role of competition among firms in the downstream market as a
force affecting the incentives to sign exclusive contracts and their potential for exclusion. Besanko
and Perry (1994) explore the role of spatial differentiation across retailers. Sass (2005) provides
a comprehensive overview of the main mechanisms used in the literature to rationalize the use of
exclusive dealing.
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between areas where Miller and Anheuser-Busch use exclusive contracts and areas
where they do not and finds no statistical evidence of foreclosure. My approach
shares similarities with Asker (2016) because I also use demand estimates to infer
costs downstream and compare them between exclusive and non-exclusive dealers.
However, I additionally include demand-side effects of exclusive dealing, and I focus
on differences in fixed costs and allow for endogenous market structure, while he
focuses on variable costs and keeps the market structure fixed.
The industry and demand modeling links my paper to Nurski and Verboven
(2016). They estimate a model of spatial demand and perform counterfactuals that
assess the collective incentives for incumbent manufacturers to maintain these agree-
ments. While Nurski and Verboven (2016) make an extensive analysis of demand
and manufacturers’ incentives for exclusive contracts, I model the distribution net-
work and estimate the fixed costs borne by these retailers. My model contains the
channels for exclusive dealing of Nurski and Verboven (2016), where it shifts utility
and it lowers product availability for rival brands. In addition, my model incorpo-
rates supply side motives for exclusive dealing, where retailers might deal with only
one brand because it is cheaper for them to do so. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first paper that explores jointly supply and demand side mechanisms for
exclusive dealing.
Other work in this area includes Ater (2015) who finds that exclusive contracts
between fast-food restaurants and shopping malls impact competition negatively
by lowering the number of restaurants, increasing prices and limiting total sales.
Eizenberg et al. (2017) focus on the dynamic effects that exclusive contracts between
Intel and PC makers had on the development of its competitor AMD. Chen (2014)
analyzes the entry of specialty beers and does not find any foreclosing motives behind
exclusive contracts by incumbent breweries.
This article is also related to the stream of literature on endogenous product
offerings. Examples include Fan (2013) in the newspaper market, Draganska et al.
(2009) on the variety of vanilla ice cream, or Eizenberg (2014) in the PC market. In
my model, the strategic considerations that determine dealers’ endogenous choice
of brands are analogous to those shaping firms’ decision to introduce a product in
these papers. Dealerships decide with their brand offerings what bundles of goods
to offer and with them determine (endogenous) product availability in the market.
Finally, the estimation of fixed costs relates to the literature that uses moment
inequalities to overcome the problem of multiple equilibria (Ciliberto and Tamer,
2009; Pakes, 2010; Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii, 2015). This approach has been used
recently in a number of empirical applications in industrial organization and trade
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(e.g. Holmes, 2011; Morales, Sheu, and Zahler, 2015; Houde, Newberry, and Seim,
2017; Wollmann, 2018). One main difference across these papers is how they deal
with the potential selection issues induced by structural disturbances in the fixed
costs. I contribute to this literature by introducing a new way to circumvent this
issue.
In summary, my contribution is manifold. First, I estimate a model that combines
supply and demand to quantify the effects of exclusive dealing. Second, I determine
retail brands within the model. Third, I introduce another strategy to deal with the
selection problem common in the literature using choice data. Finally, I construct
a novel dataset containing data on car sales and retail points in Spain.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I describe the data. The
model is presented in section 1.3. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 describe estimation and
results respectively. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data
My dataset concerns the market for cars in Spain from July 2016 until August 2017.
First, I use data on car registrations from the traffic registry. Second, I supplemented
these car registry data with additional characteristics of cars that I collected from
specialized magazines. Third, I collected data on car dealerships locations from web
searches. Finally, I use information on population demographics and locations of
consumers from Governmental Offices. I discuss each of these data in turn.
1.2.1 Car sales and characteristics data
I obtained data on car sales from the Spanish Directorate-General of Traffic (DGT)4.
These data consist of daily information on all cars registered in the Spanish terri-
tory starting in December 2014. The data include a written description of the car
model and its Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). They comprise a number of car
characteristics such as engine displacement, horsepower, type of bodywork, number
of seats, energetic propulsion, and the postal code and municipality where the car
was registered.
I use observations corresponding to new cars, 4x4s or small pickups used for
non-commercial purposes. In total, in the period between July 2016 and August
4The data can be observed at https://sedeapl.dgt.gob.es/WEB IEST CONSULTA/microdatos.faces,
and its documentation (in Spanish) at https://sedeapl.dgt.gob.es/IEST INTER/pdfs/disenoRegistro
/vehiculos/matriculaciones/MATRICULACIONES MATRABA.pdf
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2017, there are 1,091,932 registrations from 7,712 different municipalities. I chose
this time window because it approximately coincides with the period on which I was
able to collect the data on dealerships.
Table 1.1 shows market shares for car makes and models. It is notable that
no make has a market share close to the 30%, which the General Vertical Block
Exemption considers to be worrisome for legal vertical agreements5. In particular,
no car make appears to dominate the market: all market shares are below 10% and
the market leaders change across time periods and geographic regions.
Table 1.1: Market shares of best selling car makes and models
Make Share Sales
Peugeot 8.44% 70,805
Renault 7.68% 64,416
Volkswagen 7.22% 60,578
Seat 6.53% 54,790
Ford 6.27% 52,570
Opel 5.99% 50,266
Citroen 5.90% 49,535
Toyota 5.43% 45,577
Nissan 5.15% 43,192
Kia 4.75% 39,817
Total 100% 839,086
Model Share Sales
Leon 2.51% 21,066
Qashqai 2.44% 20,464
Sandero 2.22% 18,652
Golf 2.19% 18,351
Ibiza 2.16% 18,164
Clio 2.01% 16,894
308 1.86% 15,594
Megane 1.82% 15,257
Corsa 1.79% 15,042
Tucson 1.74% 14,613
Total 100% 839,086
I collected data on car characteristics from a series of specialized magazines (pri-
marily autobild.es and autopista.es). These characteristics include list prices, mea-
sures of fuel consumption, car dimensions and weight. The data are detailed at the
model (e.g. Ford Fiesta), version (e.g. Ford Fiesta 3P), and trim (e.g. Ford Fiesta
3P 2008 1.25 Duratec 82CV Trend) level.
I constructed a baseline model by merging the two datasets. First, I classified
the models from the registry’s string descriptions using automatized text analysis.
Subsequently, I used information on bodywork type, measures, number of doors and
horsepower to determine the car’s version. Finally, I matched each registry entry to
the car trim with the closest identifying characteristics. I define a baseline model
as the mean of all merged trims. This linkage approach preserves a larger part of
price variation in the data and controls for the fact that, especially in higher-end
cars, within-model price dispersion plays a sizable role.
I excluded car models absent at more than 30 provinces6 and car categories that
are not in direct competition with passenger cars (e.g. big vans, luxury sports cars).
5OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, p. 1–7
6Spain is divided into 23 Autonomous Communities that are subdivided into 52 provinces.
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I aggregated the data at the province level. This market definition preserves the
geographic disaggregation of the data without having markets with market share of
zero for products with low probability of being chosen. I dropped provinces outside
the Iberian peninsula (i.e. Canary Islands, Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla)
because they are geographically apart from the rest of the country.
Table 1.2 shows some descriptive statistics for different car characteristics after
matching them with the registry data. The data comprise 43 out of a possible 52
provinces7 and 234 car models with significant variation in their characteristics. The
average price is around e 34,300, and the average horsepower around 144 CV, but
they both have a large dispersion.
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of car characteristics
Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs
Model
Horsepower 144.34 60.23 60 422 234
Weight (100 Kg.) 14.55 3.35 8.05 24.65 234
Size (m2) 8.03 1.06 4.48 10.36 234
Fuel Cons. (l/km) 5.08 1.19 3.3 10.61 234
Price (e 10,000) 3.43 2.16 1.02 14.86 234
Markets
Provinces 43
1.2.2 Dealer data
I next require data on locations of dealerships as well as which brands are for sale at
each dealership. This last part is particularly crucial as it drives the classification of
a dealership as exclusive. Unfortunately, these data were not available in Spain so I
collected them manually. First, I gathered the data on locations from online appli-
cations that each manufacturer has available on their websites. These applications
are normally used for manufacturers to inform about their available points of sale.
From them, I obtained a list of dealerships with their location and services for each
car brand. Second, I manually combined the observations that were points of sale
for more than one brand.
I consider two observations from different brands to be available at the same
dealership (making it a multi-dealer) if they are (i) located adjacent to each other
geographically and (ii) have the same owner. This definition is based on the observed
7These 43 provinces include 40.3 million inhabitants out of the total of 46.5 million in Spain.
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patterns for multi-dealers, where normally different car makes have separated show-
rooms and different names even if they are operated by the same owner. Since
construction and geographic distribution varies across urban and rural areas, I also
consider observations separated by a street intersection as contiguous, but not those
separated by another building or dealership.
Using this definition, the data show 44% of dealerships are multi-dealers, i.e., offer
more than one brand (which constitutes 66% of the total points of sale). There are
some brands that have their dealership networks integrated. For example, Citroen
and DS, or Renault and Dacia share all their points of sale. However, if I count
brands with integrated networks as exclusive dealing, the percentage of multi-dealers
declines substantially to 22% (41% of points of sale)
Figure 1.1: Shared dealership networks
Figure 1.1 summarizes general patterns in distribution networks. Node colors
represent the market share of the manufacturer in the market, whereas the thick-
ness of node links are the percentage of shared dealerships between the two auto
makes. This percentage is measured as the total number of shared dealerships over
the number of dealerships for the smallest of the two brands. Particularly bold links
between nodes of the same holding (e.g. VW Group, PSA, FCA) indicate that com-
mon dealerships are substantially more likely between makes belonging to the same
company - extreme cases are Renault/Dacia and Citroen/DS where distribution is
completely integrated.
13
The second observable pattern is the higher degree, in the sense of more shared
dealerships, of some brands with relatively low market shares. This phenomenon is
more prominent among Asian car makes (Honda, Mazda, Hyundai, Subaru), most
of which do not belong to any particular holding group and share more dealerships
with more different brands than market leaders like Volkswagen or Renault.
Figure 1.2: Number of dealerships per brand
Figure 1.2 shows the number of dealerships per brand. There are clear differences
in terms of dealer density across car makes and reasons to think that these differences
are not solely driven by demand concerns. For example, Renault/Dacia have as
many as 417 dealers in the whole territory whereas Volkswagen has 202 and their
differences in sales are only 0.46 percentage points. Differences in dealer density are
more pronounced in scarcely populated areas, where Renault/Dacia, Citroen/DS,
and Peugeot are spread across provinces, whereas the rest of manufacturers are only
present in urban areas.
These differences in geographic coverage are also reflected in Figure 1.3, where the
points of sales for Honda, Volkswagen and Renault are plotted. Red points denote
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exclusive dealerships, while blue points are multi-dealerships. Another empirical
regularity observable from Figure 1.3 is a larger tendency towards multi-dealerships
in rural areas as compared to more densely populated areas. This tendency is
normally attributed to the higher buyer power of the dealers present in these places
due to the lower competition that they face.
Figure 1.3: Exclusive and Non-Exclusive dealerships for Honda, VW and Renault
1.2.3 Geographic locations
One important consideration is how far consumers are willing to travel to purchase
their cars. In order to incorporate this I use data on geographic positions at the mu-
nicipality level from the National Geographic Institute (IGN). This dataset provides
geocoordinates of the boundaries of each city. Using these boundaries, I drew a large
number of random locations in each province. I weighted the draws by population
size of each municipality within every market, so that the geographic distribution
of consumers is consistent with the actual one within a province.
Table 1.3 shows the average simulated distance to the closest dealers for a number
of brands in a number of provinces. The brands in the table have different levels
of dealer density and are placed in the columns from most dense (Renault) to less
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics of distance to closest dealer (in km)
Renault Volkswagen Mercedes Mitsubishi Infiniti
Madrid 5.74 6.39 6.94 9.00 11.08
Barcelona 2.70 3.32 3.66 6.12 12.32
Murcia 8.51 12.19 12.86 15.21 23.93
La Corun˜a 7.28 8.05 12.95 14.92 23.87
Ca´ceres 15.39 21.54 22.85 35.43 148.44
Cuenca 23.34 25.70 24.75 46.25 98.75
dense (Infiniti). The provinces on the rows consist of the two most densely popu-
lated markets (Barcelona and Madrid), two middle sized provinces (Murcia and La
Corun˜a), and two very sparsely populated provinces (Ca´ceres and Cuenca).
It is visible that highly populated areas have greater dealer supply, and thus trans-
port distances are significantly shorter. This pattern is consistent across brands.
However, the change in distances is more than proportional when departing from
more to less populated areas. This fact confirms the previous observation that differ-
ences in dealer density are more pronounced in areas with less urban development.
1.3 Model
The model consists of four stages. In the first stage, dealerships draw costs and de-
cide what brands to offer taking into strategic consideration their local competitors.
After dealer configurations are determined in the first stage, manufacturers deter-
mine their wholesale prices in the second stage. In the third stage, manufacturers
set cars’ list prices. Finally, consumers purchase their cars.
The primitives of the model are the utility parameters, the marginal costs for
each car model and the fixed costs of establishing a dealership. In what follows, I
introduce the model starting from the demand side.
1.3.1 Demand
I model demand using a random-coefficient-logit specification (Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes, 1995). Individual i chooses what car j ∈ J to buy. The indirect utility
for an individual in market m from buying product j at dealership d is given by
uijdm = δjm + µijm + γidm + ijdm,
where δjm = x
′
jmβ+αpj+ξjm is the base utility for product j in market m. This term
contains observable car characteristics xjm and pj that include fuel consumption,
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size, engine power, and price. The characteristics also include dummy variables
for province and country of origin of the car. I use these fixed effects to proxy
for unobserved effects that are market and brand specific. The ξjm includes car
attributes that are observed by the consumer, but unobserved to the econometrician.
The heterogeneity in consumers is captured by µijm+γidm+ ijdm, which consists
of the ijd, idiosyncratic consumer disturbances that are assumed to be distributed
according to a type I extreme value distribution. Heterogeneity in consumers’ sen-
sitivity to prices are captured in the interaction term µijm = σyimpj, where yim
represents income of consumer i.
The term γidm = γ1EDd+γ2distid explains the heterogeneity in consumers’ access
to dealerships in their choice sets. I follow Nurski and Verboven (2016) and capture
the impact of these characteristics by using two attributes: distance to the dealer
and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the dealer is exclusive (EDd). The exclusive
dealing dummy contains any possible demand effects that exclusive retailing can
induce, e.g., being more prestigious, delivering a better service or enjoying additional
promotional efforts.
Geographical distance to dealerships is also included in Albuquerque and Bron-
nenberg (2012) and adds a spatial dimension to the model. Its coefficient explains
the impact that traveling distance to a point of sale has on the utility of consumers.
I anticipate that coefficient is negative, as in Nurski and Verboven (2016) and Al-
buquerque and Bronnenberg (2012), meaning that consumers value proximity to
dealers.
While I observe sales at a very local level, the exact point of sale where trans-
actions take place as well as consumers’ residences are unknown to me, so I need
to simulate them. I simulate random consumer locations in each market from a
distribution that draws with higher probability locations from municipalities that
are more populated.8 I compute for each of these simulated locations the distance
to every dealer to get dist(i, d), and I set EDd equal to 1 if a dealer is exclusive and
0 otherwise.
An issue that arises with modeling purchases as a combination of product and
dealer is that it expands the choice set for consumers exponentially, posing a sub-
stantial computational burden. I take a similar approach to Nurski and Verboven
(2016) and assume the choice set to contain all possible car models from their clos-
8Consumers are assumed to be distributed uniformly within a municipality. This distributional
assumption does not seem to be restrictive given that Spain is characterized to have numerous
small municipalities.
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est available dealer. This assumption reduces the choice set in each market to a
maximum of 238 products.
Reducing the dealerships in the choice set to the nearest simplifies computation,
but imposes restrictions. This assumption eliminates a large part of dealership
competition within car brands because no consumer can take two dealerships selling
the same car into consideration. Competition among two retailers dealing for the
same brand boils down to the spatial dimension, i.e., which of the two is closer to a
consumer9.
I believe this restriction is less relevant in the context of this paper since the focus
is on downstream incentives to engage in exclusive contracts. Moreover, I limit its
effects using a large number of simulations. In this manner, an area that has many
dealers will have different closest dealers, whereas areas with fewer dealers will have
the same closest dealers in every simulation.
I complete the discrete choice model of demand by introducing an “outside”
option, which includes not purchasing a car, purchasing a car outside of the 238
models considered, or purchasing a car from a dealer-product combination outside
of the ones allowed by the model. I assume this outside product to have a base
utility that is normalized to zero, i.e., ui0m = i0m.
Following Nevo (2001), I group parameters into θ1 = (α, β), and θ2 = (σ, γ1, γ2).
Assuming that consumers purchase their most preferred car, the distribution of
unobservables yi, dist(i, d), EDd, and ijdm define the simulated individual choice
probability. Let xm, p, and δm denote the vectors containing xjm, pj, and δjm for
every car j and market m, then
Ajm(xm, p, δm; θ2) = {(yi, ijdm, dist(i, d),EDd) | uijdm ≥ uikdm ∀k = 0, 1, ..., Jm}
defines the set of unobservables for which product j is chosen. Given parameters,
the market shares for each product are defined as
sjdm =
∫
Ajm
δjm + µijm + γidm
1 +
∑
k∈J (δkm + µikm + γidm)
dGy(y)dGd(dist,ED),
where the fraction term denotes the individual choice probability sijdm. Its formula
comes from the assumed distribution function for ijdm. The G(·) functions are the
9The coordination of competition within a distribution network is the focus of some theoretical
papers (e.g. Lin, 1990; O’Brien and Shaffer, 1993) and it is a rationale for exclusive dealing akin
to that of exclusive territories (Rey and Stiglitz, 1988, 1995).
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distribution functions for each unobservable. For simplicity, they are assumed to be
independent of each other.
1.3.2 Price Competition
This part of the model follows the empirical literature that uses market data to
infer marginal costs and upstream wholesale prices, (e.g. Sudhir, 2001; Brenkers and
Verboven, 2006; Berto Villas-Boas, 2007). I assume that price setting takes place
in two stages and that manufacturers set both. First, I assume that manufacturers
set wholesale prices in order to maximize their profits. These wholesale prices are
realized and observed. Subsequently, manufacturers set list prices such that retailers
can extract a margin that is consistent with profit maximization.
Data limitations drive this assumption. I do not observe transaction prices, and
therefore I use list prices to approximate them. Since there is one list price for each
product across markets, manufacturers maximize the profits of the whole network of
retailers so that, on average, retailers have incentives to comply with manufacturers’
pricing instructions.
I explain the pricing of the model in an inverse order and start with the list prices.
Let each dealership d have a profit function of the form
pid =
∑
m∈M
∑
b∈ad
∑
j∈b
(
pj − pwj
)Mmsjdm(θ, p, a)− Fd(ad),
whereMm is the size of market m in the set of all markets M . qjdm =Mmsjdm are
the quantities of product j sold by dealer d in market m predicted by the demand
model. I denote pj and p
w
j as list and wholesale prices respectively.
I denote by b ∈ B a brand in the set of all car brands. The set of brands that
dealership d sells for is denoted by ad, which is chosen from Ad - a subset of the
power set of brands P(B). Finally, a = (a1, ...aD) displays all brand offerings for
all the dealers in the market, and Fd(ad) are the fixed costs of opening a dealership
selling ad. More detail on this will follow in subsections 1.3.3 and 1.4.
The profit function above yields list-pricing first-order conditions
∂pid
∂pj
=
∑
m∈M
(
qjdm +
∑
b∈ad
∑
k∈b
(
pj − pwj
) ∂qkdm(θ, p, a)
∂pj
)
= 0 for all j ∈ b and b ∈ ad.
These first order conditions are used by manufacturers b ∈ B to set their list prices
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so as to maximize the profits of its joint network.
∑
d∈D
I{b ∈ ad} · ∂pid
∂pj
= 0 for all j ∈ b, (1.1)
where I{b ∈ ad} is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if dealer d offers brand b
(i.e., b ∈ ad). From equation (1.1), one can rearrange its terms in matrix notation
to get
q +
(∑
d∈D
∆d
)
(p− pw) = 0, (1.2)
where ∆d is a J × J matrix where an element is equal to ∂qjd(a,θ)∂pk =
∑
m∈M
∂qjdm(a,θ)
∂pk
if product j and k are sold by dealership d.
Notice that this expression is similar to the standard multi-product firms’ pricing
equations in many papers estimating demand (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes,
1995), except for the term including
∑
d∈D ∆d. In my model, this term emphasizes
the role of dealer networks internalizing manufacturers’ incentives. This conceptual
difference can be best explained with an example. For two brands with integrated
dealership networks (e.g., Renault and Dacia), the entries in this term are always
going to be different from zero, and the sum is going to entail the same derivative as
in a standard ownership matrix. In this case, integrated points of sale make compat-
ible downstream pricing with common ownership. In general, common ownership is
more prevalent in the pricing equation the more dealers the brands share.
Despite being restrictive, this modeling of list prices is sensible and captures a
series of mechanisms that are important when studying exclusive dealing in a spatial
market. First, notice that equation (1.1) is equivalent to the equilibrium condition
arising from a model where all retailers set prices independently: pj would still be
the average retail price for product j. Second, list prices derived from these first
order conditions capture the spatial dimension for product competition through the
derivatives at the dealer level.
Finally, having solved for list prices, one can go back to the stage where wholesale
prices are decided. Manufacturers’ profit maximization for a firm f selling a series
of brands b is
max
{pwj }
Πf (p, p
w) =
∑
b∈f
∑
j∈b
(pwj − cj)qj.
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1.3.3 Entry
A dealer d in the pool of potential entrants E is located at ld and chooses what
brands to offer (ad) from the set Ad ⊂ P(B). It can choose to offer one brand, e.g.
ad = {Peugeot}, or many brands, e.g. ad = {Peugeot, Suzuki, Subaru}, or none,
i.e. ad = ∅. The last option corresponds to the case in which the entrant decides to
stay out of the market. The set of entrants is D ⊆ E. Dealerships take their entry
decisions ad to maximize their expected profits given the choices of competing rivals
(pid(ad, a−d)) and their information set Id:
max
ad∈Ad
E[pid(ad, a−d)|Id] = E
[∑
m∈M
∑
j∈Jd
qjdm(θ, a)(pj − cj)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[VP(a)]
−Fd(ad). (1.3)
where Fd(ad) are the fixed costs of establishing a dealer of type ad. These costs are
a function of the brands in ad, and whether the dealer is exclusive or not. I assume
the fixed costs to have a simple function of the form
Fd(ad) =
∑
b∈ad
(Fb + ν
b
d) + I{|ad| > 1} · CMD + νld, (1.4)
where, as explained in the previous subsection, Fb is the cost dealership d faces when
offering brand b and CMD are the potential additional costs that can occur when
dealing with more than one brand. They also include structural disturbances νbd and
νld which represent unobserved idiosyncratic cost components that dealer d observes,
but that I do not. νbd are unobservable shocks to fixed costs that depend on the brand
choices of dealer d, while νld are unobservable components to dealers’ locations. I
assume that these costs are such that E
[
νbd
]
= E
[
νld
]
= 0. This functional form
is very simple, but the parameter CMD accounts for potential jumps in the cost
function when transitioning from exclusive dealing to multi-dealing.
The term E[VP(a)] denotes the expected variable profits of dealer d, and it entails
two assumptions that facilitate estimation and are commonly shared in most appli-
cations (e.g. Holmes, 2011; Eizenberg, 2014; Houde, Newberry, and Seim, 2017).
First, it implies that the expectations of the dealers are correct10. Second, it as-
sumes that the dealers’ information set does not contain any additional unobservable
knowledge about its expected variable profits.
10Pakes (2010) and Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015) point out that a weaker condition on
agents’ expectations can also work. It is enough to assume that dealers do not have any systematic
bias or deviation in their expectations. In other words, they can have wrong expectations, as long
as they are not consistently wrong.
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This profit function captures downstream competition in the model. Exclusive
dealing enters both variable profits (through market shares) and fixed costs. Mar-
ket shares bring strategic interactions between geographically close competitors into
account. The estimated magnitude of the distance parameter in the demand deter-
mines, in turn, the relevant market for a dealership and the intensity of competition.
If consumers are averse to driving far to buy a car, dealerships compete with each
other locally, and more locally the higher this aversion is.
Multi-dealerships are more profitable in markets with higher isolation between
points of sale as it allows the dealer to offer a more extensive selection of products
and occupy a more substantial part of demand. In markets with a dense dealership
structure, exclusive dealing is favorable in that (i) it reduces costs, allowing competi-
tors to stay in the market even with smaller sales, and (ii) it differentiates dealerships
from each other by offering different sets of products, relaxing competition (Besanko
and Perry, 1994).
1.4 Estimation
I estimate the model in three steps. First, I estimate the demand parameters θ1 =
(α, β), and θ2 = (σ, γ1, γ2). Using these estimates, I back out product unobservable
characteristics ξˆjm(θˆ) = δ(θˆ2) − Xjmβ + αpj and manufacturers’ wholesale prices.
Finally, I use all previous estimates together with equilibrium condition to estimate
bounds on fixed costs and its parameters F = (F1, ..., FB, CMD).
1.4.1 Estimation of demand parameters θ = (θ1, θ2)
I estimate the demand model following the methods proposed in Berry (1994) and
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, BLP). These estimation methods are based
on equating predicted and observed market shares for every product and market,
so as to then back out the value of average utility δ and minimize the difference
ξ(θ) = δ(θ2) − Xβ − αp. The model is estimated by General Method of Moments
(Henceforth GMM, Hansen, 1982) using the moment condition
E[Z ′ξ(θ)] = 0,
22
where Z is a matrix of instruments, and ξ is the vector of unobserved product
characteristics. The estimates θˆ are given by
θˆ = arg min
θ
ξ(θ)′ZW−1Z ′ξ(θ),
where W is an estimate of E(Z ′ξξ′Z).
In order to control for potential correlation between unobservables ξjm and prices
pj, I use the set of instruments proposed in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
These BLP instruments include own car characteristics, sums of characteristics from
the same manufacturer, and sums of car characteristics for rival products. I classified
all car models into their market segments and performed these operations within
segments for additional variation.
In addition to the BLP instruments, I incorporate as instruments neighboring
demographics and rival dealer characteristics similar to Fan (2013) and Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2010). These “Waldfogel” instruments (Waldfogel, 2003; Berry and
Haile, 2009) make use of the geographic nature of dealer competition and modeling.
For any dealership, its rival points of sale are those for which there exists at least
one simulation draw with both of them in its choice set. Given this definition, I use
as an instrument for a product in a dealership the demographics of simulation draws
that have some of its rivals in their choice set, but not the original dealership.
The intuition of these instruments can be best described with an example. For
dealership A, income in some neighboring area might not affect it directly because
it does not receive any demand from it. It can, though, affect directly the demand
of some rival retailer B that is closer to that area. In this manner, since endogenous
variables for rival dealer B are affected by the income of this area, then it also affects
through competition, the ones of dealership A. Similarly, since dealerships are locally
competing, the distance to rival points of sale determines to a great extent whether
a given location is considered to be far by consumers or not.
I require an additional assumption on the choice set of consumers to use the
BLP instruments for the reason that their identification hinges on changes in the
characteristics of rival products (Berry and Haile, 2014). I let the choice set of
consumers be all models available at less than 80 kilometers of distance11. This
assumption is sensible in the light of the very few cars that are bought from brands
that are located far away and the low number entries that are registered in a province
other than the one of purchase. It is also in line with empirical evidence, Murry
11I performed robustness checks with 60 and 70 kilometer and they did not present any strong
difference.
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and Zhou (2017) observe that less than 5% of car purchases take place at a distance
further than 48 kilometers.
Finally, it is important to note that, as in most of the literature on endogenous
product characteristics, estimating demand on observed dealerships might suffer
from selection. This issue arises because choosing a brand for which to retail might
be correlated with unobservable characteristics of the products offered by it. In this
case, the timing of the model alleviates these concerns. When choosing which brands
to deal, retailers are assumed not to know the realizations of unobserved product
characteristics (ξ) and can only condition their choices on variables that are also
observable to the econometrician. This argument is used in Eizenberg (2014), where
it is also formalized.
1.4.2 Estimation of wholesale prices and unobserved prod-
uct characteristics (ξ)
I recover product characteristics that are unobserved to the econometrician as the
residual ξ(θˆ) product of δ(θˆ2)−Xβˆ + αˆp from the demand estimation parameters.
The collection of all residuals ξ for a given product over all markets (i.e., the set
{ξjm(θˆ)}m∈M), defines the empirical distribution function for the unobservables of
that product that I use later for the simulation of expected variable profits.
Marginal costs are backed out using demand parameters and the distribution
of consumer locations. Unfortunately, I do not observe transaction prices in the
different stores, which limits the possibility of inferring wholesale prices at the store
level. Following Section 1.3.2, I use the equality in equation (1.2) to solve for the
vector of wholesale prices pw given the vector of list prices (p), the realized profile
of brand offerings (a), demand parameters (θˆ), and the inferred unobservables (ξˆjm)
pw = p+
q∑
d∈D ∆d
.
I compute the product derivatives over prices at the dealer level approximating them
via Monte Carlo integration. The derivatives are given by
∂qjdm(a, θˆ)
∂pk
=MmNS−1
NS∑
i
I {d ∈ Ji} ∂sijdm(a, θˆ)
∂pk
,
where aside from previously introduced notation, I denote I {d ∈ Ji} an indicator
function equal to 1 when dealer d is in the choice set of consumer i (characterized
by Ji).
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1.4.3 Estimation of fixed costs
I follow the literature using profit inequalities to estimate fixed costs (Ciliberto
and Tamer, 2009; Pakes, 2010; Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii, 2015). This approach
flexibly accommodates multiplicity of equilibria and large action spaces. However,
this comes at the expense of partial identification of fixed costs. In what follows, I
describe the assumptions necessary to estimate the parameters in (1.4).
Assumption 1 (Best Response Condition). If ad is observed to be the strategy
played by dealership d, then it must be the case that
max
ad∈Ad
E[pid(ad, a−d)|Id] ≥ E[pid(a′d, a−d)|Id] for every a′d ∈ Ad and d ∈ D.
Assumption 1 describes the common equilibrium assumption for this subgame.
It says that if a vector of dealership choices is observed in the data, these actions
are profit maximizing and hence no unilateral deviation could make them better off.
This assumption is common to the literature. This best response condition delineates
the principle on which the moment inequality conditions of this estimation strategy
are built. That is, I add (and subtract) brands to the observed offerings in order to
estimate bounds on the parameters.
The presence of structural disturbances νld, ν
b
d reconciles differences between the
model predictions and observed actions. However, a problem of selection arises in
that structural disturbances are not mean zero conditional on observed choices, even
if they are unconditionally so. Pakes (2010) details several strategies to overcome
this issue.
Location unobserved components are easy to control for given the separable func-
tional form. Their disturbances are differenced out since I construct my moments
by changing brands choices and keeping locations fixed. I introduce Assumption
2 in order to construct a way to circumvent the selection problem occurring with
νbd. In essence, I create counterfactual inequalities that hold no matter what deci-
sion retailers make in order to be able to use the unconditional expectation of νbd.
Since E[νbd] = 0, these unconditional moments eliminate the selection effect. Let
a
b−
d = ad\{b}, and ab+d = ad ∪ {b}.
Assumption 2 (Eventual (Un)Profitability). Let d, d˜ be two observed dealerships
with ad and ad˜ respectively, and suppose b ∈ ad˜. Then, if dist(d, d˜) < L there exists
at least one id ∈ {0, 1}|−d| with a′−d = id · a−d + (1− id) · ab−−d such that
E[pid(ab+d , a
′
−d)|Id] ≥ E[pid(ad, a′−d)|Id].
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Conversely, let b ∈ ad, then there exists at least one id ∈ {0, 1}|−d| with a′−d =
id · a−d + (1− id) · ab+−d such that
E[pid(ab−d , a
′
−d)|Id] ≥ E[pid(ad, a′−d)|Id].
There are two points to note about Assumption 2. First, it specifies the area
close to a dealer offering a specific brand (henceforth neighboring area). In these
neighboring areas, the demand for a product of this brand is very similar for the
original dealer as it would be for any neighboring dealer, should they also offer it.
Logically, if a dealership is observed to be in a location, it means that there is enough
demand around that area to sustain that dealership.
The spatial structure of the model implies that, in equilibrium, neighboring deal-
ers normally tend to choose brands that their rivals are not choosing. This aspect is
implied by the fact that, if two points of sale cannot relax their competition in the
model through location choices, they are going to do so by their product offerings.
This anti-coordination motive between dealers best responses could likely lead to a
multiplicity of equilibria where the brand offerings are kept fixed, but what dealer
offers which brand can be permuted.
It is useful to consider an illustrative example. In a completely isolated market
with two dealerships and two brands (e.g., Renault and Seat), assume that the first
dealership offers Renault and the second offers Seat. It is likely that, if the deal-
erships are similar in their observables, there is also another candidate equilibrium
where the first dealership offers Seat and the second Renault. A dealership might
not find it profitable to offer a brand (e.g. Seat) because there is another Seat dealer
neighboring, but it might find it profitable were that competitor not offering Seat.
The second part of assumption 2 assures that there exist alternative profiles for
which these profitable deviations can exist regardless of the unobservable νbd within
these neighboring areas. Assumption 2 basically states that, in these areas, any
dealership could potentially deal for this brand profitably (unprofitably) if intra-
brand retail competition is sufficiently relaxed (tightened). The radius of maximum
geographic distance (L) for neighboring retailers is chosen small in order for this
condition only to apply in areas where it is observed that there is enough demand
for a dealership to offer the products of this brand.
Following the previous example, the assumption states that the neighboring deal-
ership will surely find profitable to offer Seat if the rival dealer did not offer Seat
and he was the unique dealer for that brand in a large area (a
b−
d ).
I use the two assumptions to construct moment conditions that do not suffer from
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selection. The strategy I employ consists of first creating a function that subtracts
a given brand b from each dealership whenever it is possible, i.e., when that brand
is offered. For dealers for which the brand is not offered, I create a multilateral
deviation for which they could potentially offer b. This deviation is a perturbation
of the equilibrium play because it subtracts brand b from all local competitors within
a radius L12 in order to make the choice of b attractive to these dealers. I finally select
those observations that offer b profitably with a weight function and average over
dealers to construct moment conditions. I repeat the same procedure in the opposite
direction, i.e., adding a brand if possible and creating multilateral deviations if not,
and for all brands.
Let ∆x (ad, a
′
d; a−d) be defined as x (ad, a−d)−x (a′d, a−d) for a function x and any
ad, a
′
d ∈ Ad. I construct the function ∆rub (ad, ab−d , a−d) as
∆rub (ad, a
b−
d , a−d) =
E
[
∆VPd(ad, a
b−
d ; a−d)
]
− Fb − I {|ad| 6= 2} · CMD, if b ∈ ad,
E
[
∆VPd(a
b+
d , ad; a
′
−d)
]
− Fb − I{|ab+d | 6= 2} · CMD, if b /∈ ad,
(1.5)
where I {|ad| 6= 2} is an indicator function equal to 1 if dealer d offers a quantity
of brands (denoted as |ad|) different from 2. These indicators multiply the multi-
dealing costs, which are only relevant in the fixed costs function (1.4) whenever a
dealership transitions from selling for one brand to selling for two brands, or vice
versa.
For a dealership d, I define it to be in the neighborhood of b if there is another
dealer d′ selling b within a distance L from d. This definition is formalized by
N Lb = {d ∈ D | dist(d, d′) < L for some d′ ∈ D such that b ∈ ad′} .
With these neighborhoods, I construct the weight functions g1d(b, ad, a−d) and g
2
d(b, ad, a−d)
with which I define two sets of B moment conditions. In particular, let g1b and g
2
b be
g1d(b, ad, a−d) = I{b ∈ ad} · I{|ad| 6= 2}+ I{b /∈ ad} · I{d ∈ NLb } · I{|ab+d | 6= 2}, and
g2d(b, ad, a−d) = I{b ∈ ad} · I{|ad| = 2}+ I{b /∈ ad} · I{d ∈ NLb } · I{|ab+d | = 2}.
(1.6)
The weight functions in (1.6) basically selects observations that lie within a N Lb
and divides them into two groups. The first one has all observations that do not
transition from 2 to 1 brands in equation 1.5, and thus only carry information about
the component Fb in the fixed costs. The second one contains the observations that
12The results I report use L=15 kilometers, but they are robust to radius of 1, 5, 10, 20 and 30
kilometers.
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transition from 2 to 1 brands when a brand is taken. These ones contain information
about Fb and CMD. Using (1.5) and (1.6), I construct the moment conditions
m1b = |D|−1
∑
d∈D
g1d(b, ad, a−d)∆r
u
b
(
ad, a
b−
d , a−d
)
≥ 0, and
m2b = |D|−1
∑
d∈D
g2d(b, ad, a−d)∆r
u
b
(
ad, a
b−
d , a−d
)
≥ 0,
(1.7)
for i.i.d. disturbances provided that the terms |D|−1∑d∈D g1d(b, ad, a−d) · νbd and
|D|−1∑d∈D g2d(b, ad, a−d) · νbd vanish to 0 following the law of large numbers.
Similarly, I also define moments that determine the lower bounds for the param-
eters in a similar but opposite manner by defining function ∆rlb(ad, a
b+
d , a−d), and
weights g3d(b, ad, a−d) and g
4
d(b, ad, a−d) as
∆rlb(ad, a
b+
d , a−d) =
E
[
∆VPd(a
b−
d , ad; a
′
−d)
]
− Fb − I{|ab−d | > 1} · CMD, if b ∈ ad,
E
[
∆VPd(ad, a
b+
d ; a−d)
]
− Fb − I{|ad| > 1} · CMD, if b /∈ ad,
(1.8)
g3d(b, ad, a−d) = I{b ∈ ad} · I{d /∈ NLb } · I{|ab−d | > 1}+ I{b /∈ ad} · I{|ad| > 1}, and
g4d(b, ad, a−d) = I{b ∈ ad} · I{d /∈ NLb } · I{|ab−d | = 1}+ I{b /∈ ad} · I{|ad| = 1}.
(1.9)
In this case, the critical inequality to identify the potential cost of multi-dealing is
when adding a brand to an exclusive dealer. Converse to (1.6), the weight functions
in (1.9) select all the observations that do not have b ∈ ad and add to them those
that are unprofitable using Assumption 2. Using (1.8) and (1.9), I form the B
moment inequalities
m3b = |D|−1
∑
d∈D
g3d(b, ad, a−d)∆r
l
b(ad, a
b−
d , a−d) ≥ 0, and
m4b = |D|−1
∑
d∈D
g4d(b, ad, a−d)∆r
l
b(ad, a
b−
d , a−d) ≥ 0.
(1.10)
These inequalities also hold provided that the terms |D|−1∑d∈D g3d(b, ad, a−d) · νbd
and |D|−1∑d∈D g4d(b, ad, a−d) · νbd converge to 0.
The way moment inequalities (1.7) and (1.10) are constructed resembles Eizen-
berg (2014) on one side, and Pakes (2010) on the other. Eizenberg (2014) proposes
an estimate that overcomes selection by replacing the missing values with conser-
vative estimates of them. In his case, he uses the maximum and minimum of the
differences in expected profits for the observed cases as an estimate to the missing
upper and lower bounds. My approach shares some similarities in that it also ap-
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proximates the value of unobserved choices and it does so conservatively. However,
the big action set that dealers face in my game and the geographic component of
supply and demand in the model do not allow this approach to yield any kind of
informative result. This problem might be better described with an example. Fol-
lowing Eizenberg (2014), the fixed cost for a Nissan dealer will have 166 observed
upper bounds and around 3,200 that are estimated to be the upper bound of these
166. Furthermore, this upper bound might come from a Nissan dealer in Barcelona
or Madrid, which does not correspond to the possible expected revenues in less
densely populated areas. The empirical content of such an estimate might come
from below 5% of the observations.
Pakes (2010) discusses several ways to overcome selection. One these strategies
uses unconditional averages due to inequalities that hold no matter what decision
the agent has made13. My assumption is also formulated independent of agents own
choices, but instead uses that of neighbors, which should not be inducing selection
if these errors are independently distributed. Using this assumption, I can be con-
servative on which dealerships can eventually profitably offer products of a brand
and still account for selection. While it is easy to justify that a Volkswagen dealer
could eventually be profitable in some local geographic position in Barcelona, it is
difficult to justify the same for an Infiniti dealer in Ca´ceres. Table 1.3 shows that
the average consumer in that province needs to travel 148.44 kilometers to its closest
point of sale of that brand. These traveling times imply that, so far, no dealership
found offering Infiniti profitable there, even having no local rival.
In addition to these moments, I employ other moment inequalities based on Ho
and Pakes (2014). I pair couples of observations d1 and d2 where d1 subtracts brand
b while d2 adds it in order to form additional moments to identify CMD. In order to
avoid selection in these moments, I pair couples of equations in (1.5) and (1.8) to
define
∆w(d1, d2, b) = ∆r
u
b (ad1 , a
b−
d1
, a−d1) + ∆r
l
b(ad2 , a
b+
d2
, a−d2), (1.11)
which I combine with Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 and the weight functions
defined before to form
m5 = NM−1
∑
b∈B
∑
d1∈D
∑
d2 6=d1
g2d1(b, ad1 , a−d1)g
3
d2
(b, ad2 , a−d2)∆w(d1, d2, b) ≥ 0, and
m6 = NM−1
∑
b∈B
∑
d1∈D
∑
d2 6=d1
g1d1(b, ad1 , a−d1)g
4
d2
(b, ad2 , a−d2)∆w(d1, d2, b) ≥ 0,
(1.12)
13see assumption PC4b in Pakes (2010)
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where NM denotes the total number of matches formed. Intuitively speaking, mo-
ments in (1.12) select observations that transition from multi- to exclusive dealer
dropping one brand with some multi-dealer that adds that brand. The average of
these pairings should be bigger than or equal to zero if we take into account equa-
tions (1.7) and (1.10). However, these new inequalities only depend on CMD and
add a further restriction by matching independent observations.
For the estimation of parameters F = (F1, ..., FB, CMD), I define m(F ) to be
the vector containing moments [m11, ...,m
1
B, ...,m
6]. The identified set of parameters
must satisfy each of these inequality or, equivalently, be a part of the space of
parameters minimizing the objective function[
m(F )−
]′
Σ(F )−1
[
m(F )−
]
, (1.13)
where equation (1.13) is similar to the objective function in Chernozhukov et al.
(2007). m(F )− is a loss function that is different from zero whenever m(F ) is below
0, and it is 0 otherwise. Σ(F ) is the variance covariance matrix for the moments 14.
I use the method developed in Andrews and Soares (2010) to construct confi-
dence sets that contain the true Fo in 95% of the cases. In practical terms, this
methodology includes in the confidence set all vectors of parameters whose test
statistic cannot reject the null hypothesis that these vectors are equivalent to the
true parameter Fo. The acceptance and rejection regions are delimited by the 95%
percentile of the distribution of test statistics from a large number of bootstrapped
subsamples. In my application, I set the bootstrap subsamples to be one fourth of
the total sample (subsample size of around 836 observations), and the number of
bootstrap repetitions at 10,000.
I perform a search for parameters in the confidence sets as a problem of con-
strained optimization where, starting from a value within the set, I look for the
minimum and maximum values for each parameter independently subjected to the
vector not being rejected by the test. Since the set of parameters is large, I cannot
search for all parameters at the same time and I tackle this issue in two steps. In
a first step, I pair moments including pairs of parameters (F0, CMD), (F1, CMD), ...,
(FB, CMD) and perform a search for parameters independently. From the first step
optimization, I collect the sets C = {C0, ..., CB} and C =
{
C0, ..., CB
}
. Clearly,
14In this application, I assume all off-diagonal entries to be zero. i.e. I do not take correlation
across moments into account.
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pairs of Fb and CMD such that
CMD ∈
[
supC, inf C
]
(1.14)
were accepted for all optimization in the first step. In the second step, I search for
parameters in the same pairs as in the first step, but with the bounds defined in
(1.14) as additional constraints on the parameters.
1.4.4 Computing expected variable profits
In Subsection 1.4.3, I laid out the estimation strategy for fixed costs. This procedure
requires knowledge of the expected variable profits for each dealership. I simulated
these profits for both the observed equilibrium and the perturbed strategy profiles
using inferred margins, demand estimates and demographic data.
In the first step, I reorganize the dealerships according to the profile to be
simulated. In the case of E[VP(a)] no change is needed, while for unilateral per-
turbations E[VP(ab−d , a−d)] or E[VP(a
b+
d , a−d)] the change is simply subtracting or
adding a point of sale15 respectively. When simulating multilateral perturbations
E[VP(ab+d , a
b−
−d)], I subtract brand b for all dealers within a circle of 15 kilometers
around dealer d and add the brand to it.
After reorganizing dealers’ offerings, I recalculate the distances from the simu-
lated consumer locations to dealerships for each brand. Two additional assumptions
are used in order to simulate individuals and their purchase decisions: (i) I assume
that consumers are allocated uniformly within a municipality given a large set of
simulated locations, and (ii) I use the recovered empirical distribution function of ξ,
where these ξ are jointly distributed for all products across markets.
The simulation process for consumer purchases is as follows. First, I draw ξjm
for each product in each market. Second, I draw locations and other demographics
for each individual in every municipality within each market. For every simulated
individual, I also draw disturbances ijmd for each product from a Type 1 Extreme
Value distribution. With these draws I assemble consumers’ utility and compute
the car purchases for each individual as the utility maximizing product that yields
a utility higher than 0. This procedure is repeated a total of NS times.
Since all of these simulations are done in order to get the expected variable
profits for some particular dealership, I can make some simplifications that reduce
15These changes may also entail a change in exclusivity status along the process, which is con-
sidered.
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the computational expenses from these operations. First, I do not have to compute
sales for municipalities where dealer d is not in any choice set. Furthermore, I do not
need to simulate the purchases for products not sold in this dealership. It suffices
to find one product (or outside option) yielding a higher utility than any of the
products sold by this dealer in order to finish the simulation for an individual that
does not buy from d. This practical shortcut is substantially less computationally
intensive than finding the utility maximizer of the products sold by other dealers.
Finally, I calculate expected variable profits by multiplying inferred margins by
the sales for each product, and average it over the number of simulations.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Demand estimates and inferred margins
Table 1.4: Estimates for the demand model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit RC Logit RC Logit RC Logit
Price -2.232 -1.130 -1.163 -2.291
(0.220) (0.118) (0.115) (0.618)
Fuel Cons. -0.344 -0.342 -0.332 -0.214
(0.041) (0.048) (0.048) (0.067)
HP / Weight -0.113 -0.028 -0.020 0.070
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.074)
Size 1.276 1.291 1.325 2.066
(0.118) (0.132) (0.130) (0.429)
Cons. -15.200 -13.548 -13.914 -17.706
(0.978) (1.074) (1.051) (2.461)
Distance -0.556 -0.546 -0.353
(0.060) (0.060) (0.110)
ED 0.200 -0.021
(0.100) (0.154)
Price × Income 0.073
(0.023)
Origin f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.4 presents demand estimates for different specifications. Column (1)
is the baseline Logit without any random coefficients. Columns (2) and (3) add
dealership characteristics. Column (4) includes all dealer variables (exclusivity and
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distance) and interactions of price with income. It is the specification used for the
supply side estimates.
In line with intuition, the coefficients for distance and price are negative and
significant across the different specifications. Consumers dislike paying more for
their cars and traveling longer distances. The positive sign of the interaction term
of income with price means that demand becomes less sensitive to price as income
increases. According to the estimates, for a consumer with an annual income of
e 20,000, a price increase of e 1,000 for a car has a comparable effect to 6.07 kilo-
meters of additional travel distance to the point of sale for this car. Exclusivity
enters positively in specification (3), but loses significance when income random
coefficients are added in column (4).
The rest of parameters have signs in line with what is expected: fuel consumption
reduces the utility for the car while size has a positive sign. Horsepower over weight
has a changing sign and it appears to be not significant in many of the specifications.
Figure 1.4: Distribution of elasticities at local markets
Figure 1.4 represents the distribution of own price elasticities for the different
products and markets, while Table 1.5 shows which car models are pricing at the
highest and lowest elasticity segments. Aside from luxurious cars, most of the local
elasticities oscillate between -15% and -2.26%, with an average of -7.73% (median
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Table 1.5: Top 5 Highest and Lowest Elasticities
Brand Model Elasticity Brand Model Elasticity
Highest 5 Elasticities Lowest 5 Elasticities
Land Rover Range Rover -33.78 Dacia Dokker -2.56
Porsche Panamera -30.70 Ford Ka -2.48
BMW Serie 6 -25.75 Dacia Logan -2.33
Mercedes Clase S -24.62 Dacia Sandero -2.30
BMW Serie 7 -23.05 Skoda Citigo -2.30
Median
Volkswagen Beetle -6.39
Mini Paceman -6.30
6.30%) decrease in demand for a 1% price increase. Whereas demand estimates
show that distance has a sizable effect on utility, most elasticity differences across
products are driven by prices.
Figure 1.5 shows the inferred marginal costs and margins for all cars. On the
horizontal axis there are all car models ordered by price. The blue bars are all the
inferred marginal costs, whereas the red area on top of them are the margins. The
relatively small magnitude of the utility estimates for all car characteristics except
price imply a relatively constant markup in absolute terms, or in other words, a
markup that proportionately reduces as car list prices increase. The average markup
is around e 3,130.
1.5.2 Fixed Costs’ estimates
Table 1.6 reports the fixed costs’ estimates for the model. Columns Upper and Lower
report the bounds corresponding to the 95% confidence set for these parameters. The
confidence sets for the different brand related cost components show a very large
difference across brands. In all cases, these bounds are relatively large, but in most
cases they are bounded away from zero. Brand cost can be separated into three
groups: brands like Alfa Romeo, Ssangyong, Subaru and Suzuki, whose costs are
rather small (below e 1 million) and their intervals not very wide; middle brands,
with wider parameter intervals and higher upper bounds (e.g. Ford, Hyundai, Opel,
Nissan, below e 7 million). Finally, the third group is composed by popular brands
and higher class manufacturers (e.g. Audi, BMW, Peugeot, Volkswagen, Mercedes)
and their fixed costs can exceed the e 7 million.
The parameter for the cost of multi-dealing is negative, but not significantly dif-
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of dealer expected margin by car
ferent from zero. This result rejects the hypothesis that manufacturers use exclusive
contracts to deter other brands from their points of sale by raising their costs to offer
products from other manufacturers. It is dealerships who choose to deal exclusively
in their trade-off between differentiating from rival dealerships and offering more
products.
The results in Table 1.6 are robust to different radius for the neighboring dealers
and they also do not seem to vary substantially under alternative algorithms. A
natural robustness check is to perform in the first step the parameter search jointly
for several brands, instead of doing these searches parallely, in order to account for
potential correlations remaining unaccounted by the estimates. I tested several of
these combinations without finding qualitative differences.
Another potential concern with these estimates arises from the side of the speci-
fication. It is plausible to think that some manufacturers might have more power or
more interest in raising costs than others, and therefore the parameter CMD captures
an average cost of multi-dealing across brands. Accommodating this heterogeneity
across groups of brands is possible, although it would entail a reformulation of the
moment conditions in (1.7) and (1.10) so as not to count the CMD twice.
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Table 1.6: Fixed costs’ estimates (in e 10,000)
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Alfa Romeo 10.3750 112.3477 Mini 31.0048 233.3680
Audi 248.9550 967.3268 Mitsubishi 57.6487 253.7285
BMW 240.7112 1427.9737 Nissan 105.1268 453.3960
Citroen 158.1234 409.9916 Opel 112.3373 473.0761
Fiat 31.8118 199.4893 Peugeot 232.2222 982.2118
Ford 109.0567 382.4699 Porsche 1049.9087 5929.1565
Honda 35.2027 221.0466 Renault 314.3647 950.5661
Hyundai 110.0356 515.8113 Seat 243.6576 840.3873
Infiniti 43.2850 299.4948 Skoda 63.6640 367.2605
Jaguar 90.1613 601.0930 Smart -9.9428 60.6519
Jeep 37.5273 266.4081 SsangYong 17.8420 118.3771
KIA 114.6440 580.4779 Subaru 1.9487 78.3876
Land Rover 116.1576 623.2758 Suzuki 15.3060 98.6510
Lexus 20.3505 35.8169 Toyota 117.6452 443.0447
Mazda 86.8278 440.2257 Volkswagen 213.7001 746.6376
Mercedes 248.3775 906.8245 Volvo 92.0989 499.0274
Multi-Dealing -62.5631 1.1340
1.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has added to the debate on the potential anticompetitive effects of ex-
clusive dealing from an empirical perspective. I estimated a structural model that
combined demand and supply, and incorporated the manifold effects of exclusivity.
Exclusive contracts can boost demand through increased promotional effort and
better dealer service, but it can also be used to raise the fixed costs of distributing
for rival brands, and deter competition from other brands within dealers. Moreover,
exclusive dealing can be used by dealers as a means to differentiate from their local
competitors. In order to capture this differentiation motives, my model extended
the literature allowing for dealers to choose the brands that they sell endogenously.
For estimating this model, I assembled a novel dataset that combines information
on car sales and car retailers from Spain. These data contain sales for a large number
of car models in the market, and the specific location and brand offerings for all the
dealers for the 32 most popular car brands in the country.
Furthermore, my estimation of the supply side contributed to the recent literature
using moment inequalities to estimate fixed costs. In particular, I proposed a way
how to circumvent the potential selection on unobservables that might happen when
using equilibrium choices to estimate parameters. My approach is well-suited to
spatial markets and it can be used in problems where the agents have large action
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spaces. It is based on using counterfactual dealer offerings for those observations
that are selected out in order to account for them.
The results of my estimation suggest that (i) there are no particular effects in
utility derived from exclusive dealing, (ii) there are no sizable costs additionally
when multi-dealing. These two findings lead to conclude that (iii) spatial competi-
tion among downstream competitors creates the conditions for which they take up
exclusive dealing in order to differentiate from their rivals in the products they offer.
These conclusions are in line with the Chicago school view that exclusive contracts
are not anticompetitive because they are not used to exclude rivals, and have large
implications for regulatory policy in retail markets.
Two questions for future research are whether there actually exist difficulties for
smaller manufacturers to access to retailing points, even if driven by competitive
forces, and, if so, what is the impact of this exclusion on welfare. The model and
estimation of this paper laid the foundations to answering questions of this kind,
and more generally to analyze the effects of vertical restraints on market structure
and product variety.
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Chapter 2
Exclusive Territories and Brand
Proliferation: A Simulation Study
2.1 Introduction
Vertical restraints are subject of much interest and debate for policy-makers and
researchers both in the U.S. and in Europe. However, the regulation and study of
them are complex. It is difficult to know the kind of relationship in which parties are
formally engaging because vertical contracts are usually private. Furthermore, such
agreements typically include several restraints, so it is hard to analyze the effect of
each of them in isolation. These issues are present in the empirical literature, where
researchers are forced to proxy vertical restraints with other variables. Nevertheless,
they are also pervasive in the theory literature, where most papers analyze the effect
of one restraint at a time, limiting the validity of their predictions.
In this paper, I use the model and estimates from Cattaneo (2018) to simulate
counterfactual market configurations under a combination of vertical restraints. In
particular, I evaluate the consequences that relaxing local competition through ex-
clusive territories would have in terms of exclusive dealing and gaining access to
points of sale by smaller manufacturers.
Most of the regulation regarding the distribution of new cars in the past few years
was aimed at facilitating the access to points of sale to smaller manufacturers while
allowing all manufacturers to establish their networks flexibly. The ultimate goal
of such regulations is to prevent an anti-competitive use of distribution networks
and guarantee competitiveness in the market. For this purpose, a policy study that
introduces products from smaller manufacturers for commercialization at different
dealers in an exogenous fashion (as in Nurski and Verboven, 2016) might prove
39
successful at fulfilling this aim. However, it ignores that these dealers could have
potentially commercialized these products before and decided not to.
In contrast, I introduce a policy that relaxes competition by restricting brand
choices and let the dealers form the new distribution networks in equilibrium play.
In so doing, any change in the reach of the distribution network of smaller manu-
facturers is an endogenous consequence of the model.
Moreover, evaluating such a policy is interesting from a regulatory stance. The
framework and estimates in Cattaneo (2018) suggest that local competition could
potentially play an essential role in the use of exclusive dealing and access to points
of sale by smaller manufacturers. The intervention that I analyze in this paper
bears a resemblance to exclusive territories in that it grants intra-brand territorial
protection to dealers by restricting neighboring dealers’ choices of brands. These
practices are, in general, accepted in the European market. However, they are
prohibited when selective distribution is in place, as it is the case for car retailing.
Contrary to what Cattaneo (2018) suggests, I find a modest increase in the num-
ber of points of sale for smaller manufacturers as a result of this policy intervention.
The territorial restriction reduces the number of dealers for those manufacturers
with denser networks, and thus it mechanically increases the market share of smaller
manufacturers. However, there are very few smaller brands being incorporated to
dealers’ offerings in equilibrium, and there is a general reduction in the total number
of dealerships. These results suggest that the proposed policy intervention would
not be effective or profitable and that the current limits to the use of exclusive
territories in the industry are a sensible regulatory choice.
Aside from a clearer interpretation of the estimates, the possibility of exper-
imenting with policies using simulation analyses is the main appeal of empirical
structural models. Some of the most popular applications of these kinds of policy
experiments in the literature are implemented using demand models and limiting
supply responses to adjustments on the intensive margin. Examples of these policy
experiments include simulating the effects of an exogenous merger (Nevo, 2001), an-
alyzing the welfare impact of a new product introduced exogenously (Petrin, 2002),
or studying the introduction of different taxes, subsidies or trade quotas taking
product offerings as given (Goldberg, 1995, 1998).
Counterfactuals acquire a particular relevance within the literature on endoge-
nous entry and product offerings. They allow generating supply responses at the
extensive margin to changes in model primitives. These reactions might mitigate
or exacerbate the original effects of policy interventions and introduce the strate-
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gic considerations that shape market structure. In the context of car dealerships
and manufacturers, simulating an endogenous market structure permits to predict
what would be the brand presence that would result in equilibrium after a policy
intervention. Such an exercise allows bridging the gap between policy measures and
their objectives.
Despite the importance of considering endogenous market structure responses,
using the framework of Cattaneo (2018) for this purpose presents several challenges
that I tackle in this paper. More concretely, I adapt the model in this paper to
allow for a feasible computation of equilibria under the alternative policy scenario.
First, I provide with additional conditions to sidestep the issue of making predic-
tions in the presence of set estimates as it is the case in Cattaneo (2018). Second, I
reduce the number of potential actions for every player by proposing an alternative
representation of the strategy space. This representation allows for a vast strategy
space for players while reducing the number of alternative computations substan-
tially. Finally, I use a heuristic iterative process to compute the equilibria of the
model. The use of such dynamic processes reduces processing time further, as well
as the number of equilibria.
I organize this paper as follows. In Subsection 2.1.1, I review the related liter-
ature. I present the data and the subsample that I use for the analysis in Section
2.2. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the modeling and computational underpinnings
of this exercise. Finally, I come to an end by presenting the results in Section 2.5,
and concluding in Section 2.6.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is closely related to a companion paper (Cattaneo, 2018). While I use
the same model and data in both articles, the topics developed in each are comple-
mentary. In Cattaneo (2018), I estimate a model of supply and demand to analyze
and quantify the effects that exclusive dealing has in the car retail industry. I do not
find evidence in Cattaneo (2018) to support the hypothesis that exclusive dealing is
used with foreclosing purposes in this industry. By contrast, the central exercise of
this paper is not to estimate a model, but to use the model in Cattaneo (2018) to
analyze a policy intervention simulating endogenous market structures.
Aside from this very clear relation, this work is very much related to the vast
literature using entry models to endogenize market structure. Some first attempts at
these exercises predicted the number of entrants to a market (Bresnahan and Reiss,
1991; Berry, 1992). The literature developed to answer more challenging questions.
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Mazzeo (2002) introduced entry and endogenous product offerings, Seim (2006) used
an entry model to explain location choices, and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) studied
the competitive effects in the airline industry posing particular emphasis on the
importance of firm heterogeneity in markets with few participants.
The literature on endogenous product offerings developed largely in the num-
ber and complexity of applications. Papers like Draganska et al. (2009), Fan (2013),
Eizenberg (2014), and Wollmann (2018) include not only a fully characterized model
of supply but also incorporate demand. This extension allows to develop richer com-
petition patterns in their simulations. Finally, a last strand of the entry literature
deals with dynamic entry games. This literature normally uses a framework similar
to Ericson and Pakes (1995), and has blossomed in the last few years with a large
number of applications (e.g., Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami, 2017).
For the computation of equilibria, I relate to the popular literature on learning
models (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Young, 2004, and the references comprised
in these books). This literature explores the use of learning heuristics to learn
about the different epistemological properties from equilibria in general classes of
games. Recently, many papers in the applied and empirical literature have used
these dynamics (e.g., Wollmann, 2018) following the suggestions and work from Lee
and Pakes (2009). These learning dynamics help to construct a feasible strategy for
equilibrium computation and selection.
Finally, the policy that I implement for the counterfactual simulation relates to
the literature on exclusive territories. A large part of this literature points at the
potential anti-competitive effects of exclusive territories (Rey and Stiglitz, 1995;
Piccolo and Reisinger, 2011; Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2014), although there are other
papers that argue that exclusive territories could reduce the incentives to free-ride
and increase demand (Klein and Murphy, 1988; Mathewson and Winter, 1994).
There is also a developing literature on the empirics of exclusive territories both
in a reduced form (Sass and Saurman, 1993; Burgdorf, 2019), and in a structural
approach (Brenkers and Verboven, 2006).
Unlike all of these papers, my work does not aim to answer any efficiency-related
question about exclusive territories. Instead, I use this restraint to create a manda-
tory separation between dealers of the same brand. This separation, in turn, relaxes
intra-brand competition and induces dealerships to deal for smaller manufacturers.
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2.2 Data
The data are from a variety of sources. The whole data contains car sales and
dealerships in Spain from July 2016 until August 2017. Due to computational lim-
itations, I will limit the scope of this paper to the territory, including the region
of Asturias, and its neighboring areas. In what follows, I start by describing how I
collected the data on car dealerships and the choice of the subsample that I use for
the policy experiment. Finally, I describe the data on car sales and characteristics,
and I characterize the main descriptive statistics of the relevant market.
2.2.1 Dealer Data and Clustering
I collected data on dealers’ locations and brands for sale manually due to the lack
of an available survey comprising all of them. First, I web-scraped the services that
each dealer offers and their geographic coordinates. This information is available
at the webpage of each manufacturer, where they construct interactive applications
with maps to locate their points of sale.
These online applications list the points of sale of their manufacturer, but they do
not provide any information about whether there are other brands sold in the same
dealership. Moreover, it is often the case that the same owner uses two different
corporate names to sell products of two different manufacturers. For this reason,
I combined manually the observations gathered from these applications to know
whether a dealership sold one brand exclusively or whether it did so with more
than one. I classified two observations from different brands to be a joint dealership
(i.e., a multi-dealership) if I find them to be (i) located next to each other, and (ii)
owned by the same proprietor. The full sample contains 3345 dealers for the 32
most popular manufacturers in Spain. Around 22% of them are multi-dealerships.
I chose to extract a subsample of dealers from the vicinity of Asturias for the
analysis of this paper. This region is suitable for several reasons. First, Asturias has
two big cities (Oviedo and Gijo´n) with a rich and diverse network of dealers situated
close to each other. Second, while it is relatively populated with dealers to its West
(Ourense), its East (Cantabria), Southeast (Palencia) and South (Leo´n) have very
few dealers. The aspect of this relative isolation is essential because it guarantees
that the resimulated dealers are not significantly affected by dealers outside of the
subsample.
I subdivided the whole sample into geographic clusters using a hierarchical ag-
glomerative clustering algorithm, as shown in Figure 2.1. This unsupervised machine
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Figure 2.1: Map of Geographic Clusters
learning algorithm matches dealers spatially starting from single observations, and
moving up in the size of clusters. It does a better job at recognizing the uneven
patterns of agglomeration in metropolitan areas than other algorithms based on
minimizing the distance from a centroid.
After dividing the dataset into several clusters, I extracted the cluster that cor-
responds to the territory of Asturias. The selected sample of dealers can be best
summarized in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, and Table 2.1. Figure 2.2 shows the geographic
distribution of exclusive and multi-dealers in the selected cluster. The large majority
of the 77 dealers is located around the metropolitan areas of Gijo´n and Oviedo with
16 and 27 dealers within 15 km from the city center, respectively. There is another
smaller focus of dealers located in Avile´s (12 within the same radius). These three
cities are at a distance of 20 to 25 km to each other.
In Table 2.1, I show some descriptive statistics related to dealer co-location and
branding. The large average distance to the closest dealer in the cluster (1.08 km)
is a result of the large heterogeneity that there is in density between rural and
urban areas, whereas the median distance (0.25 km) shows the prevalence of some
large areas of tight competition. There is a large prevalence of exclusive dealing
that corresponds proportionally to the whole sample (79.22 % in the subsample of
Asturias against a 78.43 % of dealers in the whole sample).
The distances of dealers to their closest competitor outside of the cluster is a
good measure to see the adequacy of the subsample. The average dealer finds its
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Figure 2.2: Exclusive and Non-Exclusive dealerships for all brands in the simulated clus-
ter
nearest competitor at a distance of 51.61 km. This distance shows that, within
the sample used for the simulation, there is almost no outside cluster competition
given a disutility from traveling distance as the one estimated in Cattaneo (2018).
Moreover, the entire cluster is somewhat isolated as dealer closest to an external
competitor is still at a distance of 15.20 km.
Finally, I show the distribution of brands in the market in Figure 2.3. I use a
similar definition as Nurski and Verboven (2016) and distinguish between entrant
(yellow) and incumbent (black) car manufacturers. The classification aims at dif-
ferentiating between the manufacturers that are well established and popular in the
Spanish market from the rest. Figure 2.3 displays a sharp contrast in the dealer
capillarity between one group and the other. Moreover, the subsample preserves the
differences in dealer capillarity across manufacturers that exist in the whole Spanish
territory. Renault, Citroen, and Peugeot have particularly dense networks, while
other established brands have around half as many dealerships. Luxurious brands
(Audi, BMW, and Mercedes Benz) have more selective distribution networks and
thus less numerous dealerships.
2.2.2 Car sales and characteristics data
I built the data on car sales using the registry from the Spanish Directorate-General
of Traffic (DGT). This registry contains daily information on all new cars circulat-
ing in Spain from December 2014 until the current day. While the data contain
interesting individual information like the postal code and municipality where the
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Table 2.1: Geographic descriptive statistics
Geographic Statistics
Min Mean Std. Dev. Median
Distance to closest dealer inside 0.009 1.088 3.129 0.245
the cluster (kms)
Distance to closest dealer outside 15.202 51.613 11.015 54.797
the cluster (kms)
Dealers Statistics
Total
Average Number of Points of Sale 5.667
(Incumbents)
Average Number of Points of Sale 2.100
(Entrants)
Number of Exclusive Dealers 61.000
Number of Dealers 77.000
buyer registered its car, it does not provide the actual address of the buyer or the
dealership in which he or she acquired it.
To overcome this issue, I simulated consumer locations from a distribution that
I created using data from the National Geographic Institute (IGN). These data
contain information about municipality boundaries that I used to draw numerous
geographical coordinates for every province and weight them by the population size
of each of these towns and cities within each province. Then I matched them to the
closest dealer of each manufacturer within a radius of 70 km to form the choice set
of each simulated consumer.
The registry data also comprises a written description of the car model and trim,
and its Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). Moreover, the data include car charac-
teristics like engine displacement, horsepower, bodywork, energetic propulsion, and
the number of seats. To reduce the number of available models for the demand
model, I classified each of the entries into a car model (e.g., Ford Fiesta) using
the written description of the registry, and text analysis techniques. Following the
classification into models, I used other car characteristics to distinguish across car
version (e.g., Ford Fiesta 3P), and I matched these car versions to the closest trim
(e.g., Ford Fiesta 3P 2008 1.25 Duratec 82CV Trend) in terms of horsepower. Fi-
nally, I defined a baseline car model as the sales-weighted average over the different
trims that I recognized in the data. In total, I have 234 different car models from the
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Figure 2.3: Number of dealerships per brand in the simulated cluster
32 most popular manufacturers comprised in the data that I merged with other car
characteristics like list prices or weight using data from specialized car magazines.
Table 2.2 displays the ten most popular car makes and models in Asturias, and
shows their market shares conditional on car sales. The region follows similar pat-
terns as the total Spanish territory. No brand holds more than a 9% market share,
and Renault is the most popular with 1,717 cars sold during the period and around
an 8.70% conditional market share. The lack of a dominant car manufacturer assures
that there should in principle not be any concerns regarding the competitiveness of
the market, and contrasts with other regions where a single producer has a market
shares over 18% (e.g., Palencia - Renault 18.6%, Toledo - Peugeot 24.2%, and Val-
ladolid - Renault 22.2%). Moreover, the most sold models are also of similar cuts
and characteristics as the ones that are popular for the whole country.
These similarities in terms of preferences give additional validity to the use of
Asturias as a representative sample for the policy experiment. Table 2.1 comple-
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Table 2.2: Market shares of best selling car makes and models in Asturias
Make Share Sales Model Share Sales
Renault 8.70% 1,717 Qashqai 3.17% 626
Peugeot 7.95% 1,569 Astra 2.71% 535
Opel 7.70% 1,520 Sandero 2.67% 528
Nissan 6.25% 1,234 Leon 2.65% 523
Seat 6.20% 1,224 Megane 2.22% 438
Kia 6.11% 1,206 Golf 2.16% 427
Citroen 6.09% 1,202 Ibiza 2.16% 426
Volkswagen 6.00% 1,186 Corsa 2.13% 421
Ford 5.69% 1,123 Clio 2.10% 414
Dacia 5.30% 1,047 308 2.04% 402
Total 100% 19,740 Total 100% 19,740
Table 2.3: Sales-weighted descriptive statistics for the whole and selected samples
Asturias
Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Total Sales
Horsepower / Weight 8.85 1.15 6.35 8.65 22.47 19,740
Size (m2) 7.76 0.71 4.48 7.91 10.36 19,740
Fuel Cons. (l/km) 4.66 0.79 3.31 4.60 10.61 19,740
Price (e 10,000) 2.54 1.02 1.02 2.45 13.81 19,740
Spain
Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Total Sales
Horsepower / Weight 8.88 1.17 6.35 8.73 22.47 999,163
Size (m2) 7.80 0.74 4.48 7.91 10.36 999,163
Fuel Cons. (l/km) 4.65 0.80 3.31 4.60 10.61 999,163
Price (e 10,000) 2.62 1.11 1.02 2.49 14.86 999,163
ments this view showing sales-weighted descriptive statistics for Asturias and Spain
as a whole. The country has a very diverse demography that, in turn, leads to a
lot of local diversity in preferences. Rural areas have on average bigger and heavier
cars that are less fuel-efficient, whereas urban areas display an opposite pattern. In
contrast, the table shows that there are minimal differences in the average charac-
teristics of the cars that are purchased and that there are no significant changes in
their distribution. The average price is slightly lower in Asturias (e 800), and a bit
less dispersed, but the rest of the characteristics have almost identical distributions.
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2.3 Model and Simulation Process
The model primitives, timing, and information structure follow from the framework
developed in Cattaneo (2018). In this section, I explain in detail the model of supply
and demand that lays the foundations for the policy experiment. The model is built
on four different stages. In the first stage, all the dealerships decide simultaneously
on the brands that they offer, given the costs that they draw and playing equilibrium
strategies with their local competitors. After retail networks are determined, car
manufacturers determine wholesale prices in the second stage and set cars’ prices
in the third stage. In the final stage, once all prices and points of sale are realized,
consumers buy their preferred cars taking into account both products’ and dealers’
characteristics.
2.3.1 Demand
In my framework, I use a random-coefficient discrete-choice model for the demand
of my framework (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995). The indirect utility for an
individual i in market m buying a product j from a dealership d is
uijdm = δjm + µijm + γidm + ijdm, (2.1)
where δjm = x
′
jmβ+αpj + ξjm is the part of utility that is common to all individuals
buying product j in market m. The term xjm thereby contains different product
characteristics like car size, horsepower divided by weight, and fuel consumption.
It also includes a full set of province and car make origin fixed effects to control
for additional characteristics that are inherent to the market or brand, but that
remain unobservable to the econometrician. The elements in vector pj are the cars’
list prices that are assumed throughout the paper to coincide with the transaction
prices. I model unobserved product heterogeneity with the term ξjm that captures
all possible remaining characteristics that influence consumer choices, but that I
cannot possibly observe.
The remaining terms are consumer-specific, and thus form part of the random
coefficients of the utility. The idiosyncratic disturbance term ijdm is assumed to be
distributed as a Type I extreme value distribution so that the applied discrete-choice
model is a Logit model. I use the term µijm = σyimpj to introduce heterogeneity in
the price sensitivity owing to differences in consumers’ income (yim).
I model the dealers’ characteristics that consumers take into account for their car
purchases following Nurski and Verboven (2016). I do not allow every consumer to
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have all dealerships in his or her consideration set due to computational limitations.
For this reason, I assume the set of possible dealers from which a consumer can buy
to consist of the closest one of each car make that this consumer has available. This
assumption can be regarded as rough but is not any stricter than assuming some
other substitution pattern between dealerships, and it fits well with the random
coefficient nature of the model. In this way, areas with a relatively low density of
dealers will have the same closest dealer for the different consumer locations in the
whole market, whereas those areas with lots of intra-brand dealer competition will
have different consumers’ draws buying from different dealerships.
These characteristics enter in the term γidm = γ1EDd+γ2distid. EDd is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 when the dealership is an exclusive dealer and 0 otherwise.
It comprises demand effects that might arise as a result of the dealer being exclusive,
better service, or higher promotional efforts. The variable distid is the geographical
distance from the simulated consumer location of consumer i to the point of sale d,
and it captures the distaste against traveling far to purchase their cars.
Finally, I bring the demand model to a close by introducing an “outside” good
that includes the possibility of not buying any car, buying a car outside of the ones
considered in the dataset, or buying a car from a dealer-car combination that is
not considered in the model. I normalize this outside good to have a total utility
ui0m = i0m, where i0m is also distributed as a type I extreme value.
The primitives of this demand model can be grouped into θ1 = (α, β) that enter
δjm linearly, and the random coefficients θ2 = (σ, γ1, γ2) that depend on the simu-
lated variables. Let xm, p, and δm denote the vectors containing xjm, pj and δjm for
every car j and market m. Then it is the distribution of the simulated variables yim,
distid, EDd, and ijdm that define the individual choice probabilities of the simulated
consumers. In particular, I define
Ajm(xm, p, δm; θ2) = {(yi, ijdm, distid,EDd) | uijdm > uikdm ∀k = 0, 1, ..., Jm}
to be the set of individual characteristics for which product j is preferred over any
alternative. Given the demand primitives, the market shares are defined as
sjdm =
∫
Ajm
δjm + µijm + γidm
1 +
∑
k∈Jd(δkm + µikm + γidm
,
where the individual choice probabilities are denoted by sijdm that take this form
due to the distribution of the error terms ijdm. The functions Gd(·), and Gy(·) are
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the distribution functions for dealer characteristics and income, respectively, and
are assumed to be independent of each other.
2.3.2 Price Competition
I base the price competition on the literature that uses market data to study vertical
relations and infer the determinants of competitive behavior upstream (Sudhir, 2001;
Brenkers and Verboven, 2006; Berto Villas-Boas, 2007). I model price setting to
be decided by manufacturers both upstream and downstream, and in two stages.
In the first stage, manufacturers set wholesale prices to maximize their profits as
multi-product oligopolists. Once these wholesale prices are realized and observed,
I assume that manufacturers place list prices for their products to maximize the
profits of their networks. These list prices are in turn the final transaction prices.
The lack of transaction price data determines this modeling assumption, but it
encompasses properties that make it sound for this framework. First, maximizing
the profits of the joint network by the manufacturer assures that all dealerships
extract a margin from the list prices, unlike in the scenario where manufacturers set
both prices maximizing their profits. Second, on average, dealerships do not want
to deviate from these prices, as it would be the case if they were allowed to set their
prices separately. Finally, the cross-derivatives that enter the derivatives over each
dealerships’ profits interiorize the intra-dealer competition that manufacturers face
when selling their products through shared dealerships.
Following this assumption, the first order conditions of a manufacturer b ∈ B that
sets the list prices of its products (denoted with a slight abuse of notation j ∈ b) to
maximize the joint networks’ profits are given by
∑
d∈D
I{b ∈ ad} · ∂pid
∂pj
= 0 for all j ∈ b, (2.2)
where pid are the profits of dealership d, and I{b ∈ ad} is an indicator function equal
to 1 if brand b is in the brand offerings the dealer (ad). The brands offered by d
are chosen from the set Ad which is a subset of the power set of brands P(B). The
profits of a dealer d take the form
pid =
∑
m∈M
∑
b∈ad
∑
j∈b
(
pj − pwj
)Mmsjdm(θ, p, a)− Fd(ad), (2.3)
where pj and p
w
j denote list and wholesale price, respectively. The sales of a product
j by dealer d in market m that the model predicts are qjdm =Mmsjdm, where Mm
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is the total number of consumers in market m ∈M . The market shares sjdm depend
on all brands offered by all the dealers in the market a = (a1, ..., aD). The last term
of the profit function are the fixed costs Fd(ad) that are specific to the products
offered when commercializing the brands in ad.
I plug in the derivatives of the profit function in equation (2.3) into the first
order conditions of the joint network in (2.2), and rearrange the terms of it in
matrix notation to get the expression
q +
(∑
d∈D
∆d
)
(p− pw) = 0, (2.4)
that I will later use to back out wholesale prices using observed list prices and the
optimality conditions from the model. The matrix ∆d is a series of J × J matrices
where their jk-th element is
∂qjd
∂pk
=
∑
m∈M
∂qjdm
∂pk
for those dealerships where both
products j and k are sold. This term represents the role that dealers’ brand offerings
play for internalizing manufacturers’ incentives. For brands that do not share any
dealerships, this term is 0. In contrast, for two brands with integrated networks,
e.g., in the case for Renault and Dacia, the entries of these matrices are always
positive, and they collapse into the standard ownership matrix that is employed in
most of the literature.
Finally, a firm f owning different car brands b sets wholesale prices to maximize
its profits
max
{pw}
Πf (p, p
w) =
∑
b∈f
∑
j∈b
(
pwj − cj
)
qj, (2.5)
where cj are the costs that the firm faces when producing a particular car j.
2.3.3 Entry
Dealers decide on their entry into the market and the brands that they sell in the
first period. Each potential entrant d from the set E is endowed with a location
ld, and chooses simultaneously whether to enter the market or not (ad = ∅). The
choice of entering the market comprises at the same time the brands that dealer d
chooses to offer from the set Ad ⊂ P(B), and in turn, whether dealer d becomes an
exclusive dealer or not. For example, a dealership d that chooses to sell only Peugeot
(ad = {Peugeot}) becomes an exclusive dealer of that brand, whereas one that sells
many brands, e.g. ad = {Peugeot, Suzuki, Subaru}, becomes a multi-dealer.
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Dealerships draw idiosyncratic cost components νbd for each brand b ∈ B , and
νld for their location. These costs are assumed to have E[νbd] = E[νbl ] = 0, and to be
common knowledge amongst dealers, but unobserved by the researcher. In total, a
dealer faces fixed costs of the form
Fd(ad) =
∑
b∈ad
(
Fb + ν
b
d
)
+ I {|ad| > 1} · CMD + νld. (2.6)
In this simple functional form, each brand offered has a total cost Fb + ν
b
d, while
there is an additional cost (or cost efficiency) CMD when the dealership offers more
than one brand (i.e., |ad| > 1).
After observing its fixed costs, a dealership maximizes the expectation of its
profits considering its brands to offer (if entering at all)
max
ad∈Ad
E[pid(ad, a−d)|Id] = E
[∑
m∈M
∑
j∈Jd
qjdm (θ, a) (pj − pwj )
]
− Fd(ad). (2.7)
The expression in (2.7) represents the expected profits of dealer d conditional on its
information set Id. In this expectation, I assume that, apart from the idiosyncratic
costs νld and ν
b
d, the information set does not contain any additional unobservable
knowledge about the dealer’s profits. In particular, it does not contain information
about demand unobservables which are denoted byξjm.
The term in the expectation operator are the variable profits which I denote
as E[VP(a)] henceforth. This expectation is taken over the unobserved product
heterogeneity ξjm and the consumer idiosyncratic utility component ijdm. The fact
that ξjm is not part of the information set of the dealerships at the moment of entry
is crucial and in line with Eizenberg (2014). It implies that dealers cannot observe
whether a particular product is more profitable or popular in a particular area or not,
and thus, they can enter the market only based on cost unobservables. Moreover,
I assume that the expectation operator in E[VP(a)] is correct like it is the case
in most of the related literature (e.g. Holmes, 2011; Eizenberg, 2014; Houde et al.,
2017). This assumption facilitates the simulation process and prevents modeling a
particular kind of bounded rationality for the dealerships.
The expected profit function captures the way downstream competition frames
market structure in the model. Strategic considerations in the brand offerings and
exclusivity are contained in E[VP(a)] through the relative distance to consumers
that competitors inside and outside the brand have.
The expression also summarizes the mechanisms that are going to be at work at
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my policy simulation. Relaxing spatial competition increases the incentives to estab-
lish multi-dealerships since they are more profitable in markets where the distance
between competitors is higher. Exclusive dealing turns out to be more convenient
in markets where dealerships are closer to each other as they operate under lower
costs, permitting dealers to stay in the market, reducing their scale. Furthermore,
it allows competitors to differentiate from each other by offering different products,
and thus it relaxes competition (Besanko and Perry, 1994).
Unlike other spatial regulations, the policy experiment that I implement with
exclusive territories relaxes intra-brand competition in particular. This aspect pro-
vides an additional mechanism for smaller manufacturers to access points of sale.
The spatial restriction to establish dealers within one brand favors the appearance
of dealerships of alternative manufacturers. Some dealers that prefer a brand that
is subject to a territorial restriction would tend to substitute this brand by an al-
ternative manufacturer.
2.4 Policy Experiment
After having introduced the data and the theoretical framework, I develop a policy
application around which I center this paper. First, I describe how I introduce
exclusive territories for the distribution of manufacturers in the model. In addition
to that, I also include these exclusive territories in the data taking into account that
the observed data is in equilibrium without territorial protection.
I devote the latter part of this section to bridge the gap between the theoretical
foundations of the model and the implementation of the policy experiment. In
particular, I describe the additional assumptions and practical aspects, which are
required for the computation of the expected profits, equilibria, and the selection
among these equilibria.
2.4.1 Description and Implementation
As mentioned earlier, I consider the introduction of intra-brand territorial restric-
tions in the form of exclusive territories for dealerships. Exclusive territories are a
permitted practice under the competition law of the European Union. The Vertical
Block Exemption Regulation permits the general use of partial territorial protection
in the contracts between suppliers and distributors under fairly relaxed criteria so
long as they do not violate the so-called “hardcore restrictions”.
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In specific terms, a supplier can grant territorial exclusivity and protection to
a seller in an area to preserve it from the competition by any other seller of that
supplier. These clauses prohibit setting any other distributor that sells products of
the same supplier in the area and also forbid active selling (e.g., targeting customers)
in the territory by sellers placed elsewhere. However, passive sales (e.g., attending
unsolicited customers’ requests) cannot be restricted and place absolute territorial
protection as a “hardcore restriction”.
The case of car distribution is one exception to the permissive use of exclusive
territories in the European market. The Vertical Block Exemption prohibits to
combine the use of selective distribution criteria and exclusive dealing with any
territorial restriction.
Within my framework, I explore the scenario of allowing for territorial restrictions
in this market, prohibited in practice. With this exercise, I evaluate what would
be the consequences in exclusivity and brand proliferation of restricting intra-brand
geographic competition. In particular, I include endogenous responses by dealers
when joining a distribution network to changes in policy. This feature is crucial
in the design of policies targeted at promoting access to points of sale for smaller
manufacturers. Naturally, there are other additional policy targets in the regulation
of the European Union that might not be fully captured by this analysis, such as
the creation of a common market or guaranteeing low prices.
I implement this policy experiment in two stages. First, I start with all the dealers
having their current equilibrium play offerings as observed in the data. I perturb
this equilibrium eliminating points of sales from all manufacturers randomly so that
they comply with being at least at a 10 km radius distance from each other. I
sequentially introduce this random perturbation. I order the dealerships randomly
in the sample, and following that permutation, I calculate the distance to the closest
point of sale of the same brand. If one or more brands have competitors within the
critical radius, I eliminate at most one of these brands from the dealership at random
and proceed the same way with the next dealer. The perturbation process finishes
when there are no more points of sales of the same brand at a distance below 10
km.
After I have perturbed the equilibrium in the first stage, I simulate the best
responses by every dealer in terms of adding or subtracting brands from their of-
ferings in the second stage. I do this until a new equilibrium that is compatible
with the territorial restrictions is reached. I also simulate the best responses after
the perturbation in the case where no territorial restrictions are in place to have
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a benchmark for the simulated results. In the following subsections, I describe the
different practical aspects and assumptions of these simulations.
2.4.2 Computing Expected Profits.
The first challenge when transitioning from the estimated model to a simulated
model is computing the total expected profits. I henceforth refer to total expected
profits as the sum of expected variable profits and fixed costs.
Given dealers’ offerings (ad, a−d), the computation of expected variable profits
follows a simple, yet computationally expensive, procedure. For each simulation, I
draw ξjm randomly from the joint empirical distribution function of product unob-
served heterogeneity and I update prices. Then, for each individual and product of
the simulation, I draw idiosyncratic disturbances εijdm and sum the virtual margin
that the dealer would obtain if he offered the utility maximizer product for that
individual.
Following the implementation in Eizenberg (2014), I can separate the expectation
over ξjm and εijdm which simplifies matters. In this manner, I first compute the
equilibrium expected prices with different draws of ξjm. Then, I take the expectation
over the εijdm using the Logit reduced form integral for the Type 1 extreme value
disturbances with each set of ξjm and updated prices. Finally, I take the integral
over the ξjm by averaging out over the different draws.
For the price updates, I solve for the first order conditions in equation (2.2).
I follow work by Morrow and Skerlos (2011) and Conlon and Gortmaker (2019),
and separate the term ∆d in (2.2) into a series of |D| |J | × |J | diagonal matrices
Λd with λjjd =
1
NS
∑NS
i (α + σy)Mmsijdm, and a series of full matrices Ψd with
elements ψjkd =
1
NS
∑NS
i (α + σy)Mmsijdmsikdm. With these matrices I construct
the mapping
pw +
(∑
d∈D
Λd(p)
)−1(∑
d∈D
Ψd(p)
)
[p− pw − q(p)] 7→ p.
This mapping is a contraction mapping and thus can be solved using some starting
value for p and iterating until convergence.
I assume throughout this paper that a single dealership cannot change prices
significantly when deviating to any other brand offering or leaving the market. While
this is a sensible assumption in a big market as the Spanish, it also helps to reduce the
computational burden. Otherwise, the price updating procedure has to be carried
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out for each dealer, each deviation, and each iteration, which makes the whole
simulation unfeasible. For the entire subsample of Asturias, I also assume that the
prices remain unchanged after all the simulations are finished due to its relatively
small size. An alternative that is feasible, though computationally more costly, is
to apply an iterative feedback between prices and brand offerings.
A more conceptually challenging aspect is subtracting the fixed costs from the
simulated expected variable profits. These issues are intimately related to the flexi-
bility that the use of moment inequalities permits when estimating the identified set
for the average fixed costs. First, the estimation approach allows neither to back out
idiosyncratic shocks νld, and ν
b
d, nor to estimate a reasonable distribution of them.
Second, while I estimated sets of average fixed costs in Cattaneo (2018), there is no
explicit distribution that determines which costs are more or less likely within those
sets.
There are several sets of assumptions that could close these two gaps. One could
assume the disturbances to be νld = ν
b
d = 0 for all dealers and further assume a
distribution for the mean costs Fb and CMD. In this manner, the assumed distribu-
tions create a probability over the most profitable strategy for dealer d from which
it randomly chooses over the simulations.
An alternative option is to assume that dealers make their choices on the expected
fixed costs. Then, one can compute them assuming a distribution for mean costs and
using E[νld] = E[νbd] = 0 from the model. This approach does not need additional
assumptions for the idiosyncratic disturbances but is slightly inconsistent with the
timing of the original setup. I use this approach because, given that none of the two
is consistent with the selection on unobservables, the second set of assumptions also
reduces the number of possible outcomes.
2.4.3 Strategies.
The original model assumes that the set of possible strategies could be any possible
subset Ad from the powerset of the set of all brands P(B). While it is a positive
aspect that the estimation strategy accommodates such a big strategy space, the
simulations would need to compute 2|B| possible deviations given a particular market
structure to determine the best response.
I tackle this issue restricting the number of strategies and using recursive methods
to search for equilibria. For each dealer d, I define the set of possible actions to be
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dependent from the action taken in the previous iteration with the set
Ad | ad = {ad} ∪ A+d | ad ∪ A−d | ad. (2.8)
{ad} represents the action of playing ad in the following iteration, whereas
A+d | ad = {ad ∪ {b} : for each b ∈ B if b /∈ ad} , and
A−d | ad = {ad \ {b} : for each b ∈ B if b ∈ ad} ,
represent brand offerings that require adding one brand that is not offered, or sub-
tracting one brand offered in the current iteration.
This modified strategy space interacts with recursion to find best responses in a
way that can be best described with an example. Let dealer d offer ad, all rivals offer
a−d and the best response to a−d be a′d = ad ∪ b ∪ b′ for some b, b′ ∈ B. Keeping all
rivals constant, adding b will be the preferred action in the first iteration, and adding
b′ will be optimal in the second iteration (or vice versa). From the second iteration
on, it will be optimal to keep the same action. The benefits of using this strategy
become apparent in this simple example: whereas under normal circumstances one
has to compute 2|B| different payoffs, this particular example finds a best response
after 2× |B| calculations.
Additionally, since the interest of the counterfactual analysis is to understand
the presence of smaller manufacturers, I keep those manufacturers categorized as
incumbents in Figure 2.3 fixed and consider deviations only for those brands that
are entrants. Furthermore, since some subsidiary brands have their points of sale
always connected to the main manufacturer (e.g., Smart and Mercedes Benz or Mini
and BMW), dealers that do not offer the main brand are not able to incorporate
the subsidiary brand to their offerings.
2.4.4 Game representation and heuristic dynamics.
Aside from the burden entailed in a large strategy space and referenced in the
previous subsection, there are also other difficulties that arise from the number of
players and the number of equilibria that this setup has in practice.
On the one hand, a large number of players entails a similar computational burden
as a large action space. If keeping all rivals fixed, finding the best response for
an individual player needs to compute 2|B| payoffs, finding an equilibrium where
everyone is playing mutual best responses in a sample of players J calls for 2|B|×|J |
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operations. On the other hand, the number of players multiplies the number of
equilibria as they are all ex-ante equivalent, which calls for a reasonable selection
mechanism to produce more powerful predictions from the counterfactuals.
In this regard, I follow Lee and Pakes (2009) and use heuristic dynamics to
search for equilibria. The benefits of such an approach are twofold. They allow
using much simpler rules that still converge to equilibrium1, and they provide an
intuitive principle by which to select equilibria.
I transform the one-period simultaneous-move game into an infinite-period sequential-
move game. Each period the order of play permutes randomly across players given
a starting profile a. At its turn of play, each dealership believes that all rivals
keep the same strategy as thus far, and therefore best respond to last period’s play.
This kind of heuristic behavior is known as a best response dynamic and is crucial
for my computational approach. Equilibrium play (a?) is reached when no player
wants to deviate from their previous offerings, and all possible turn permutations
are exhausted.
2.5 Results
In this section, I present the results from the simulated policy. Tables (2.4) and (2.5)
introduce the parameter values used for the experiment. While I take the demand
parameters from Cattaneo (2018), I estimated the supply-side parameters using the
approach described therein but using the relevant subsample of dealers.
I ran a total number of 200 simulations using the procedure described in the
previous sections.2 Each of these simulations permutated the order of move allowed
for the different dealers starting from the observed situation of the data described in
Section 2.2. Most heuristic playing simulations converged to an equilibrium situation
between the third and the fifth iterative round, and the incentives to deviate for any
dealer reduced drastically after the second round.
In what follows, I present some summary statistics resulting from the simulation.
I show these results and compare them in three different points in time. First, I
analyze them before the policy intervention. The second reference point I take is
right after I introduce the policy intervention by randomly eliminating the points
1When not to the set of Nash Equilibria, many of these heuristic rules are proven to converge
to weaker equilibrium concept as the Hannan Set or the set of Correlated Equilibria.
2The complete computations took slightly less than nine days in total using the computing
cluster provided by the University of Mannheim. These computations were run over 140 processors.
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Table 2.4: Demand side parameters used for the policy simulations
Demand Parameters
Regular Parameters Origin Fixed Effects
Price -2.292 France -1.527
Fuel Cons. -0.214 Japan -0.642
HP / Weight 0.070 Germany -1.397
Size 2.066 Korea -0.279
Cons. -17.706 England -1.207
Eastern Europe 0.175
Province Fixed Effects United States -2.098
Leo´n -0.952 Others -1.389
Lugo -0.719
Ourense -1.010 Random Coefficients
Asturias -0.486 Distance -0.354
Palencia -1.500 ED -0.021
Salamanca -1.573 Price × Income 0.073
Cantabria -0.854
Valladolid -0.788
Zamora -2.348
Table 2.5: Supply side parameters used for the policy simulations
Supply Parameters
Alfa Romeo [11.785, 42.807] Mitsubishi [58.606, 221.639]
Audi [103.321, 373.705] Nissan [80.749, 324.562]
BMW [131.934, 484.504] Opel [144.473, 611.422]
Citroen [144.505, 642.340] Peugeot [181.442, 800.008]
Fiat [44.363, 149.358] Porsche [11.778, 44.242]
Ford [85.900, 392.744] Renault [251.769, 1115.822]
Honda [16.540, 62.634] Seat [524.367, 1140.437]
Hyundai [116.819, 434.200] Skoda [63.201, 235.503]
Infiniti [4.834, 13.673] Smart [17.441, 61.908]
Jaguar [1617.295, 4720.331] Ssangyong [40.860, 142.257]
Jeep [33.114, 101.831] Subaru [7.452, 26.186]
KIA [183.023, 687.766] Suzuki [24.652, 82.545]
Land Rover [54.160, 138.102] Toyota [221.608, 793.871]
Mazda [88.109, 338.254] Volkswagen [106.219, 398.231]
Mercedes Benz [138.414, 538.795] Volvo [155.923, 559.679]
Mini [17.825, 70.123] Multi-Dealing [-9.7841, 16.1923]
of sale that are not compatible with the territorial protection. Finally, I show the
results after I allow dealers to converge to a new equilibrium.
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2.5.1 Sales
In Tables 2.6 and 2.7, I present predicted market shares before, during, and after
the policy intervention.3 The first columns simulate market shares using the market
structure observed in the data. One can interpret these columns in both tables as a
measure of goodness-of-fit of the demand model with respect to Table 2.2.
Although it qualitatively matches pretty well which are the popular brands and
models, the model predicts the market to be way more concentrated than it is
observed in reality. For example, Renault and Dacia are predicted to concentrate
around a 29% of the total cars sold, whereas in the sample it is observed to be a
dominant group, first in terms of sales, but with a total market share close to a 15%
only. One possible way to improve the fit of the demand model to these simulations
is to cater it more to the market of Asturias either by including a more extensive
set of random coefficients that interact with demographics or by interacting the
Asturias fixed effect to different car characteristics.
Table 2.6: Top 10 most popular brands in the policy experiment
Initial Share Intermediate Share Final Share
Renault + Dacia 29.440 Renault + Dacia 29.059 Renault + Dacia 27.038
Hyundai 11.344 Hyundai 15.033 Hyundai 13.440
Citroen + DS 7.450 Citroen + DS 8.783 Citroen + DS 8.172
Seat 6.453 Seat 8.098 Seat 7.532
KIA 5.202 KIA 6.985 KIA 6.497
Peugeot 4.901 Peugeot 5.277 Peugeot 4.909
Opel 4.263 Volvo 4.884 Volvo 4.537
BMW 3.905 Nissan 4.525 Nissan 4.207
Volkswagen 3.388 Opel 4.336 Opel 4.034
Table 2.7: Top 10 most popular models in the policy experiment
Initial Share Intermediate Share Final Share
Hyundai Tucson 8.850 Hyundai Tucson 11.728 Hyundai Tucson 10.486
Renault Me´gane 8.299 Renault Me´gane 8.192 Renault Me´gane 7.622
Dacia Duster 6.554 Dacia Duster 6.469 Dacia Duster 6.019
Renault Clio 4.484 Renault Clio 4.426 Renault Clio 4.118
Seat Ibiza 3.243 Seat Ibiza 4.070 Seat Ibiza 3.786
Kia Sportage 2.455 Volvo XC60 3.438 Volvo XC60 3.194
Dacia Sandero 2.422 KIA Sportage 3.296 KIA Sportage 3.066
Renault Sce´nic 2.119 Seat Leo´n 2.588 Seat Leo´n 2.408
Seat Leo´n 2.063 Dacia Sandero 2.391 Dacia Sandero 2.225
3These market shares are computed over total sold cars, not over the total market size.
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The jump from the first column to the second, and from the second to the third
in both tables uncovers the other main pattern from these simulations. Most of
the variations appear when eliminating the points of sale that violate the imposed
territorial protection, i.e., from the first to the second column. As a result of these
modifications, brands with a high presence in the market (e.g., Citroen/DS, Peugeot
or Renault/Dacia) reduce their sales substantially, although they remain prevalent.
The decrease in total sales shows that the outside option replaces a part of these
sales. However, another sizable portion of these buyers migrates to manufacturers
that have now an increased relative presence in the market.
The third column does not introduce significant differences when compared to
the second column, but it shows a moderation of the patterns arising from column
one to two. The tendency towards moderation is intuitive from the perspective of
equilibrium: starting from an equilibrium allocation and perturbing it, it is natural
to expect the new equilibrium allocation to go in the direction of the old. Still, the
lack of significant equilibrium effects that is evidenced by the relatively fast converge
to an equilibrium of the simulations is relatively surprising. I comment on this in
the following subsection.
2.5.2 Dealers’ structure
I present a bar chart summarizing the main patterns in dealers’ offering as a result
of the policy intervention in Figure 2.4. Following the convention that I established
in Figure 2.3, I denote entrant and incumbent manufacturers in orange and black,
respectively. Moreover, I indicate the initial and final dealer configurations in light
and dark colors. The numbers denote the initial, intermediate, and final number of
points of sale for each brand. Incumbent manufacturers have only an initial and final
number, as they were not allowed to update their points of sale in the simulations.
The policy simulation might be prone to two potential biases. One is a higher
number of smaller manufacturers than usual because I do not allow adding incum-
bents to dealers’ offerings. The other main potential criticism might be an excessive
proportion of multi-dealers with respect to exclusive dealers. The way I construct
the simulation does not contemplate the possibility for new dealerships to serve as
new points of sale for brands, so entry forcefully appears within all dealerships,
overstating the incentives to become a multi-dealer.
The plot confirms the intuition presented in the previous subsection. The terri-
torial protection mechanically eliminates many points of sales for brands that are
densely present in the market (e.g., Renault/Dacia, Citroen/DS, Peugeot), but it
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Figure 2.4: Number of dealerships per brand in the simulated cluster
does not translate into any other more prominent equilibrium effects for the deal-
erships. In particular, there is almost no increase in points of sales by entrant
manufacturers, and their sales rise mostly because of the reduced competition.
Counting a point of sale as a manufacturer that sells its products through a
dealership, the original subsample had a total of 109 points of sale distributed in 77
dealerships. Another piece of evidence that reinforces this view is that, although the
initial random elimination of points of sale leads to an average total of 88.59 points
of sale, the final average number of points of sale rose marginally to only 91.55.
The comparison between exclusive and multi-dealerships is a bit more compli-
cated through the simulations because there is a fair amount of dealerships that
have an average number of points of sale that range between one and two brands,
as well as other dealerships with average points of sale below one. In table 2.8, I
present the total average points of sale by dealer rounded up to the integers.
The results are pretty straightforward. The policy does not provide incentives to
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Table 2.8: Total number of points of sale by dealer.
# Points of Sale 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Initial 0 61 11 2 0 1 0 1 0
Intermediate 24 43 6 1 0 1 1 0 1
Final 28 40 6 1 0 1 1 0 0
multi-dealing, but instead causes a high level of exit from the market as territorial
restrictions prevent dealers from accessing their most preferred manufacturers. In
total, there is little room to see any potential benefits from such a policy.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The use of moment inequalities to estimate the model used in Cattaneo (2018)
proved effective at determining the potential costs of exclusive dealing and flexibly
identifying many parameters. It also allowed bypassing the issue of multiplicity of
equilibria in this context without leaving the question of selection unattended. How-
ever, this empirical tactic and that of its related literature shy away from providing
a straightforward use of the estimated model for simulating counterfactuals.
In this paper, I extend the framework and estimation proposed and employed
in Cattaneo (2018) to create useful counterfactuals usable for policy simulation and
evaluation. In doing so, I deal with several conceptual issues to implement a feasible
computation of the simulations for a subsample of dealers.
I use the framework and simulation procedure to study the effects of a policy
intervention in the car retailing market. I analyze the results of territorial restrictions
in dealers’ strategies for what brands to commercialize. This policy is attractive for
two main reasons. First, territorial restrictions are forbidden in combination with
exclusive dealing, and more in general with selective distribution. The combination
of vertical restraints usually is a complex puzzle to analyze, and this work is a
first attempt to do that. Second, territorial restrictions could be used as a way to
disincentive dealers to commercialize products of brands with dense networks and
make dealing for smaller manufacturers more attractive.
The results of the policy experiment do not support this last vision. In total, the
effects of territorial restrictions are a substantial decrease of points of sales by those
manufacturers with large networks, but very marginally compensated by an increase
in points of sale by smaller manufacturers. Sales of these manufacturers logically
increased because their rivals have reduced network coverage, so these changes in
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consumers’ preferences come mostly at the expense of their welfare. Moreover,
several exclusive dealers do not replace their offerings, thus leaving the market.
My results indicate that it is not advisable to implement such a policy in the car
retail industry given the overall impact of it in my simulations. Even though there
are mechanisms by which it would have been able to increase the presence of smaller
manufacturers in the market at the cost of some consumer welfare, these mechanisms
do not materialize in practice using the parameters estimated in Cattaneo (2018).
It is thus advisable to continue with the current prohibition for the development of
a diverse distribution network for automobiles.
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Chapter 3
Entry Signal and Market
Segregation
joint with Hidenori Takahashi and Yuya Takahashi
3.1 Introduction
The development and maintenance of a safe and connective transportation system
are fundamental to the economic performance of a nation. In the period comprised
between FY 1993 to FY 2013, US spending in transportation at the federal, state
and local level accounted for between 1.55 and 1.85% of total GDP, averaging a
total of $220 billion per year. Designing and securing a competitive procurement
of public transportation projects is of great importance for the government to make
use of its resources efficiently.
In this paper, we examine the role of information design in procurement auctions
using data from transport infrastructure projects in Florida. We make use of an in-
stitutional feature of our data to investigate the impact of disclosing the number and
identity of interested bidders on bidders’ behavior and auction outcomes. The De-
partment of Transportation in Florida requires contractors to solicit an information
brochure for the projects in which they are interested. The request of a project plan
qualifies a contractor as a potential bidder. This information is collected and made
publicly available before the auction for that contract takes place, so any interested
contractor knows which are the prospective bidders for any project.
The issue of coordination and collusive behavior among bidders in procurement
auctions is a subject of much interest for policymakers. There is a large literature
trying to develop techniques to distinguish collusive from competitive behavior in
auctions (e.g. Porter and Zona, 1993, 1999; Bajari and Ye, 2003). In our case, we
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evaluate the institutional design of the procurement process instead of firm conduct.
The effect of revealing information about interested firms adds to the transparency of
the procurement process (Ohashi, 2009), but it could have additional consequences
in terms of efficiency as it can lead to some implicit coordination.
On the one hand, strong contractors might have incentives to use this institutional
feature to signal their interest in some projects and relax competition by preempting
rivals from submitting a bid. While requesting an information brochure and letting
other firms know about the interest in a project is for free, entering an auction and
submitting a bid are costly. In this context, both strong and weak contractors would
benefit from some possibility of tacit coordination. The big firm would receive a
higher pay from the auction due to reduced competition. Moreover, weak contractors
would not sink costs unnecessarily participating in auctions for which they have little
chances. The impact of this part of the coordination is harmful to the buyer.
On the other hand, weak contractors can use their saved bidding costs to instead
focus on entering auctions for which there is no strong firm in contention. In this
case, revealing this information could also benefit the buyer since it improves the
matching between contractors and projects, and it increases competition in these
projects.
An extreme example of these two mechanism would be a project that has two
bidders, and another (probably smaller) project that remains unassigned because no
bid was submitted. If there was some way to coordinate, the bidders would probably
prefer to assign each one to one project. The original winner would be better off
because in the new situation he would receive a higher price. The original loser
would also benefit because he does not sink costs for nothing, and gets allocated
now to one project. The auctioneer could benefit from this coordination depending
on the balance between the outcomes of the two auctions. It will benefit if the
increase in the price paid in the first project is less than the increased surplus from
being able to procure the second project.
We develop our analysis in two steps. First, we provide with evidence that large
firms’ commitment to forego a project could signal interest in other projects. We
argue that this signaling arises in equilibrium because bidders face some degree
of substitutability across projects. This substitutability could arise from bidders’
congestion or capacity constraints.
In the institutional context of this paper, requesting a plan keeps the option to
compete for a project open. Instead, not seeking a plan is a commitment not to
compete for it. It is the substitutability across projects that allows the commitment
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not to bid for a plan to become more informative about the intentions of the bidder
in the projects for which it keeps an option. Foregoing a project also implies that
the bidder is more capable of becoming competitive for other projects procured at
the same time.
In the second stage of our analysis, we show evidence of coordination among
bidders . We find that there is a negative and significant relationship between
the number of strong contractors that are in the list of potential entrants and the
actual entry of smaller contractors. This relation is robust and maintains its sign
after controlling for a full set of fixed effects. We additionally test for the effect of
strong potential bidders in the bidding distribution for those bidders that entered
the auction after establishing the relationship between entry and signal. We find
that the threat of entry does not affect the bidding behavior of firms after controlling
for actual entry, which is expected, given the timing of the institutional framework.
Finally, we test for our proposed coordination mechanism in a reduced form setup
estimating the bid distribution for weak bidders and analyzing what is the effect of
participating in concurrent auctions. We find some evidence backing the idea that
there is substitution across projects. Specifically, we find that unsuccessful bids,
those bids that do not win an auction, cause an increase in the bid distribution for
both strong and weak bidders.
We account for two main challenges in our simple empirical model. First, the bid
of each contractor is a function of the number and type of rivals that bid for the same
project which leads to reverse causality. The other challenge is that the sample of
bids submitted for a project are a self-selected subsample from all contractors that
decided to endogenously enter into the auction. We use the techniques developed
by Heckman (1979), and frame this setup as a latent variable model where bids are
observed contingent on a selection equation that encompasses entry effects.
For our empirical strategy to work, both the endogeneity and selection issues
require excluded variables that provide with an exogenous variation. We propose
the use of plan requests by rival firms and the sum of estimated costs for simulta-
neous projects as excluded variables and argue their adequacy and limitations as
instruments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the related literature.
In Section 3.3, we describe the institutional details present in the letting process of
public projects by the Florida Department of Transportation. We also describe the
data that we use and present some descriptive statistics in this section. We introduce
a very simple stylized model in Section 3.4 where we summarize the mechanisms at
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work in our setup. These mechanisms and predictions are tested and commented in
Section 3.5. Finally, we conclude with Section 3.6.
3.2 Literature Review
Our paper originates from the strand of literature analyzing the effects of endogenous
entry in auctions (Bajari and Ye, 2003; Li, 2005; Li and Zheng, 2009; Athey et al.,
2011). Unlike these papers, we consider the endogenous formation of the set of
potential entrants.1
The aspect of endogenous interest and participation in procurement auctions
is intimately intertwined with the idea that the identity of the competing firms
might have a different impact on participation and bidding behavior. This factor
is especially relevant in our setting because there is a relatively small number of
firms that regularly provide services for the Florida Department of Transportation.
Thus, there is a general awareness among competitors about which firms are more
competitive in these markets.
Our interest to identify the differences in behavior between strong and weak
bidders relates our work to the literature that explores the relationship between ex-
ante bidder asymmetry and procurement design (Krasnokutskaya and Seim, 2011;
Athey et al., 2013). They consider the distributional effects of policies aimed at
giving preference to small contractors over top contractors using bid subsidies and set
aside contracts, respectively. We study the distributional effects of an institutional
design that does not target any particular group of bidders but has the potential to
produce similar distributional outcomes.
Our setup is a very strategic one, where actions can convey messages. Although
there is some developing literature, these kinds of setups are uncommon in empirical
research. A fascinating example is Kawai, Onishi, and Uetake (2018). They develop
and estimate a model of signaling in online credit markets where the borrowers’
reserve interest rate is used to convey information about their creditworthiness.
In our paper, the request for projects’ plans also discloses information to other
agents, but it differs in two fundamental aspects from Kawai, Onishi, and Uetake
(2018). First, the information transmitted here does not facilitate coordination
between supply and demand, but instead can tacitly coordinate the supply. Second,
we do not view our environment as one of transmission of private information.
1Outside of the auction literature, Fan and Xiao (2015) also consider endogenous potential
entrants in the context of entry to the U.S. local telecommunication industry.
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When a contractor chooses the plans to be requesting, it selects to keep an option to
participate in those projects for which it holds a plan, and commits not to submit
any bid for the others.
The idea that lies behind our stylized model and the proposed mechanism for co-
ordination relates our paper to the theoretical literature on commitment. The value
of commitment has a long tradition in game theory. The concept of commitment as
a tactic in strategic situations dates back to Schelling (1960). He pointed out that
a player could receive higher payoffs by reducing the number of possible strategies
through some commitment device previous to the game. This idea is underlying sev-
eral papers in applied theory. Caruana and Einav (2008) develop a dynamic model
of endogenous commitment. Renou (2009), Bade et al. (2009) or Lazarev (2019)
consider an environment more similar to ours. They model a two stages game where
the first stage serves for players to display their commitment strategies that frame
their options for the second stage.
There is a large body of empirical research about the lack of competition, carteliza-
tion or tacit collusion in public procurement due to its economic significance. Kang
and Miller (2017) examine the role of government preferences and discretion, limiting
the scope for competition in public procurement.
A larger body of literature is devoted to cartel detection in auctions using diverse
approaches. Some of these papers develop tests for collusion using documented cases
of detected cartels. Two early examples of this literature are Porter and Zona (1993,
1999) that analyze detection of cooperation comparing between the bids of firms
inside and outside the bidding ring.
Other papers test for collusion without having prior information about bidder
conduct. Bajari and Ye (2003) develop a test for bid-rigging comparing the predic-
tions from competition and collusion models with the data. More recently, Kawai
and Nakabayashi (2018) use variations in bid patterns in reauctions for unsuccess-
fully procured projects to develop a test for collusion in public construction projects
in Japan. Another interesting example in this literature is Chassang and Ortner
(2019) that use the effect that variations in the cartel’s ability to implement pun-
ishments have on bidding behavior to detect collusion among bidders.
Our paper does not tackle the issue of cartelization in public procurement, and
thus is less closely related to these papers. However, commitment serves as a tool
to coordinate contractors in our setup, which connects our work to the concept of
tacit collusion.
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3.3 Institutional facts, data, and evidence
3.3.1 Institutional facts
We use a sample of procurement auctions for infrastructure projects procured by
the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) over the period 2003-2014. The
FDOT is an executive agency depending from the State of Florida in charge of
providing a safe and well-planned transportation network for the mobility of goods
and people with roadway, bus, air, rail, sea, bicycle, and pedestrian facilities. The
duties of the FDOT include the construction of roads, bridges, signaling, and other
transportation facilities, as well as the maintenance, resurfacing and rehabilitation
of the ones that are already in place.
The FDOT has a decentralized organizational structure divided into seven in-
dependent district offices that span all 67 counties of the State as represented in
Figure 3.1. Each district office independently procures between 1 to 16 infrastruc-
ture projects almost every month. We define the set of projects procured in a
given month by a specific district office as a “procurement set”. Procurement sets
are composed by the FDOT’s project managers, together with various department
personnel based on district offices’ workload and availability of staff.
Every project is advertised 1 to 2 months before its project letting date. These
bid solicitation notices include diverse information for interested bidders about the
items (tasks) contracted, and the location of the project. They also include estimates
about the contract duration and construction costs developed from past data on bid
prices and costs of equipment, labor, and materials. These documents might be
modified and supplemented throughout the time to the letting process and notified
publicly.
After bid solicitation notices are posted for the month, interested firms can re-
quest brochures for project plans and specifications, as well as bid documents. Ask-
ing for a project plan is free of charge and required for a firm to bid for the project.
Some projects can additionally request a mandatory pre-bid meeting attendance for
discussion and information purposes or other prerequisites.
If a firm requests for a project plan and fulfills all requisites, this information
becomes publicly available online, and the firm becomes a potential bidder for that
particular project. When the procurement auction takes place, all prospective bid-
ders are allowed, but not obliged to submit their bids in a sealed-bid first-price
auction that automatically awards the contract to the firm providing the lowest bid.
These bids need to be specific breaking down the proposal to the prices that they
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Figure 3.1: Map of the district offices of the FDOT
charge for each task in the project’s plan. Changes in the working quantities and
prices might appear throughout the completion of the contract and are handled in
different ways depending on whether they are issued with fixed-price or unit-price
contracts (Luo and Takahashi, 2019).
3.3.2 Data
The data contains detailed information about the characteristics of each project and
auction outcomes, such as engineer’s project’s cost estimates, final payments to the
contractor, the number of days it took to be completed, and a brief description of the
tasks that were contracted. The dataset includes the identity and bids of all auction
participants as well as contractors’ traits such as bidder’s backlog, the number of
participated projects, and the location of its headquarters.
A significant feature of the data is that it contains the identity and character-
istics of all contractors requesting a plan, including those firms that ended up not
submitting a bid for the project. There are a total of 1935 different firms registered
to have solicited information for a project during the sample. A sizable fraction of
them (1435 firms) is never observed to participate in any single auction. We remove
these firms to construct the set of potential bidders. The selected sample contains
1945 projects that are spread across all counties, although a bigger part of these
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plans is concentrated in the west coast of the State. Summary statistics for these
variables can be found in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Projects’ summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Min. Max. N
Winning Score ($1,000) 3,139.63 6,271.92 7.52 148,000 1,945
Engineer’s Cost Estimates ($1,000) 3,781.10 7,608.44 5 164,000 1,945
Expected Contract Duration (# of Days) 196.12 173.85 15 2,034 1,945
Final Payment to Contractor ($1,000) 3,277.69 6,747.02 7.50 159,000 1,945
# of Participating Bidders / Auction 4.76 2.61 1 19 1,945
# of Plan Holders / Auction 39.80 22.48 1 159 1,945
There is more than apparent heterogeneity across projects. The very different
tasks that these contracts can demand also reflect inevitably in the size of these
projects. While the average winning score takes a value of $3.1 million, there are
projects as small as $7,500 and as big as $148 million. These differences also reflect
in the expected duration of the contracts: while the average lasts little more than
half a year, the total range spans from two weeks until over five and a half years.
The data also reveal a substantial variation in plan requesting behavior across
construction firms, as shown in Table 3.2. The average firm solicits 75 plans for
procurement auctions and submits more than 18 bids, though the data suggests
that it depends mainly on the identity of the contractor.
There are firms requesting over 1600 plans and placing over 400 bids, whereas
the median holds five plans and makes four bids. In order to capture a part of
this heterogeneity from the side of bidders, the nine contractors with most projects
procured are considered as top contractors throughout the paper. Top contractors
request more plans on average (460), but they are also more prone to submit bids
(around 70% entry) and win it.
It is though still revealing to observe that, even though requesting for a plan
is something that comes at no cost whatsoever, potential bidders are not remotely
close to doing so for all available projects. Out of the 500 potential entrants in the
data, only an average of 19.38 firms request the plan and bid information for a given
project. Furthermore, no project is requested by more than 69 potential bidders.
3.3.3 Descriptive Evidence on Market Segregation
The existing literature typically assumes the set of potential bidders, i.e., firms
that request project plans, as exogenous. In this section, we demonstrate that
this assumption is firmly rejected in our data. To see this, we consider the entry
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for plan request and auction entry
Variable Mean Std. Min. Med. Max. N
Firm level
# of Plans / Potential Bidder 75.39 167.27 1 17.50 1690 500
# of Plans / Top Firm 459.89 186.95 245 439 875 9
# of Bids / Potential Bidder 18.43 50.26 1 4 488 500
# of Bids / Top Firm 332.67 107.64 192 298 488 9
Project level
# of Plan Holders / Auction 39.80 22.48 1 38 159 1945
# of Potential Bidders / Auction 19.38 10.27 1 18 69 1945
# of Top Firm as Pot. Bidders / Auction 2.13 1.32 0 2 7 1945
# of Bidders / Auction 4.76 2.60 1 4 19 1945
# of Top Firm as Bidders / Auction 1.54 1.18 0 2 7 1945
and bidding behavior of weak potential bidders with and without the presence of
strong prospective bidders. Table 3.3 compares the bid submission frequency of
weak bidders when at least one strong bidder requested the project plan with the
one when there is no strong bidder requested the project plan. Asking for a plan by
top contractors seems to have an impact on the entry of small firms. While about
a 39% of small plan holders submit a bid when there is no strong potential bidder
present, this number reduces to a 24% when at least one strong firm appears on the
list.
Table 3.3: Presence of Strong Firms and Entry of Weak Firms
Submit Bid Do Not Submit Bid Total
At least one strong firm on the list 831 2616 3447
(0.24)
No strong firm on the list 1595 2501 4096
(0.39)
Total 7543
Although this correlation is meaningful suggesting that there is some kind of
market segregation across strong and weak bidders, it does not tell whether this
phenomenon is due to preemption through the threat of entry, because of harder
competition, or because of other project characteristics. In what follows, we will
provide additional descriptive evidence about project segregation based on project
characteristics and lay the foundations to the empirical approach that we will develop
in the next sections.
One potential alternative explanation for the threat of entry is that market segre-
gation happens through differences in project size. In other words, weaker contrac-
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tors cannot undertake large projects, and top contractors have no interest in small
projects.
In Table 3.4, we present the distribution of potential bidders, actual bidders, and
top bidders per project divided into the different project size deciles as measured by
the project costs estimates of the FDOT. One first pattern is that the total number
of active bidders remains relatively unchanged throughout the different deciles and
centered around 4.5 participants, although the number of potential bidders increases
with project size. Top contractors seem to be more interested in participating in
auctions for larger projects: while for the first two deciles the average participation
of big firms is below 1, the last four deciles see an average of almost 2 top contractors
bidding for the projects.
Table 3.4: Number of bidders by project size and bidder type
Proj. Cost # Pot Bidders # Bidders # Top Bidders
up to ($ 1,000) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
10% 246.17 15.76 8.17 5.61 2.99 0.41 0.72
20% 471.75 14.80 6.93 4.47 2.25 0.78 1.01
30% 818.00 15.92 7.75 4.51 2.37 1.27 1.10
40% 1,201.64 17.61 8.04 4.84 2.63 1.50 1.17
50% 1,763.76 17.94 8.22 4.41 2.20 1.69 1.21
60% 2,448.08 18.93 8.85 4.34 2.34 1.78 1.04
70% 3,477.00 20.77 8.70 4.76 2.29 1.95 1.06
80% 5,167.78 21.28 10.03 4.53 2.18 2.09 1.10
90% 7,984.41 21.58 10.92 4.55 2.63 1.98 0.98
100% 163,700.00 29.22 14.83 5.60 3.55 1.96 1.09
Another possibility for market segregation could be that weak and strong con-
tractors specialize in different tasks. In this case, projects that only have small
contractors interested would be systematically different in that they would contain
different tasks to fulfill. Figure 3.2 illustrates these differences comparing the distri-
bution of tasks contracted in projects that have at least one top contractor in the
set of potential bidders against those that do not have any. The percentages in this
distribution can sum to more than one since more than one task can be contracted
in the same project.
Projects that are only contended by small contractors tend to contain items
such as signalization, lighting, signing, and other small tasks. Instead, the projects
that attract top contractors usually include items like resurfacing and milling that
require heavier machinery. From both Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2 one can qualitatively
observe that there are specific differences in terms of project characteristics and size
that might explain a part of the market segregation across contractors. However,
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of tasks by potential bidder
these patterns do not seem striking enough to exclude the idea that there is some
preemption from top contractors to smaller ones.
3.4 Commitment and incentives to forego a project
In this section, we present a stylized model that captures the institutional details and
stylized facts of Section 3.3. We introduce a simplified model of entry to illustrate
the mechanisms working behind signaling in this environment. We also discuss the
incentives that contractors might have to forego being a potential entrant even if it
comes at no monetary cost. We then test the predictions and mechanisms proposed
in this stylized model in Section 3.5.
3.4.1 Stylized model
Consider the case of two firms where one is a strong contractor B and the other is a
weak contractor W . They compete for two infrastructure projects at the same time:
a large one L and a small one S.
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To win these projects, they must enter them at some cost. If one contractor
enters to the large project, and the other stays out of content, it earns piL > 0. The
same happens if only one contractor enters the small project, although we assume
piLi > pi
S
i > 0. We abstract, for the time being, to specify what is the allocation
mechanism in case both enter a project simultaneously. However, we assume that
if both of them participate, the project is earned by either of them, but they both
incur losses of c. These losses represent the intensity of competition and, to make
them relevant to our analysis, we assumed them to be such that c > piL − piS.
Furthermore, we crucially assume that there is some externality between projects.
In particular, if the same contractor enters the two projects at the same time, its
profits are reduced by e. This externality could be understood as some congestion
due to possible capacity restrictions.
Equilibrium without commitment. Consider first the case where no contractor
could credibly forego being a potential entrant to a project. Equilibrium in this game
depends on the size of the project externality e. If e < piS− c the externality is very
small and it does not play any sizable role, thus being the dominant strategy of each
player to enter both projects. When the externality is moderate (piS−c ≤ e < piL−c),
the costs of entering into both projects are starting to be significant, and there are
two equilibria: in each of them one of the two contractors enters at both projects,
and the other enters only at the big one.
The more interesting case arises when the externality is large (i.e. e > piB − c).
In this situation, both contractors find too costly to enter into both projects, and
have to decide on one of the two. Furthermore, given the intensity of competition
(i.e., the value of c), they aim at avoiding the competing contractor. As a result,
there are two pure-strategy equilibria: one where the strong contractor enters the
large project and the weak enters to the small project, and one where the converse
is true.
Equilibrium with commitment. Let now assume that the strong contractor
can credibly commit not to participate in the small project. When the externality is
low or moderate, this option does not play a particularly important role. In essence,
it foregoes the small project to the weak contractor, who would still want to enter
to the big project. In these cases, the strong contractor would not have incentives
to take this commitment.
Instead, this device becomes essential when the externality is high. If e > piB− c,
and the strong contractor makes clear that he will not enter the small project, then
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the only equilibrium of this game becomes the one in which the strong contractor
takes the large project, and the weak contractor undertakes the small project. Under
these conditions, the strong contractor has incentives to coordinate with its weaker
rival and get the best possible equilibrium outcome of the original game.
3.5 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section, we test empirically for the mechanisms and predictions of section
3.4. We provide a simple and descriptive empirical analysis of the different patterns
that arise in this setup. First, we inspect whether there is evidence for entry pre-
emption taking place from strong bidders to weak bidders. The second aspect that
we examine is whether a firm requesting for plan information and qualifying as a
potential bidder to a project carries any possible information to its rivals about its
intention to bid on a particular project.
These two fundamental aspects shed light on the relevance of signaling entry and
how the request for project plans could be strategic. Still, they do not explain why
would a firm forego any option to contend for a project in equilibrium. For this
reason, we analyze whether there is evidence for substitutions across projects to be
taking place in our sample.
3.5.1 Entry preemption
The descriptive statistics and the suggestive evidence of the previous sections do
not tell if the observed difference in entry probabilities is due to the actual entry of
strong firms or due to the threat of entry by strong firms. To see if weak bidders
act on the risk of entry by strong bidders, we compare those cases in which strong
bidders enter with those cases in which they do not.
In Table 3.5, we look at how small firms’ entry and bidding behavior are associated
with the number of strong participating and non-participating plan holders. The
first three columns contain a linear probability model where the dependent variable
is an indicator variable that is equal to one when a potential bidder has submitted
a bid. In these regressions, we examine what is the effect that rival strong non-
participating prospective bidders have on the auction participation of small firms.
The results show that irrespective of a strong firm submitting a bid or not, its
request for a plan diminishes the propensity for a small firm to submit a bid by a
2.7%. The result here suggests that weak bidders act on strong firms’ request for
project plans and not on the actual entry of strong firms. Another finding here is
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that weak bidders are 1.38% more likely to submit a bid when the project is the only
project from which they have solicited a project plan. These results persist after
controlling for many other factors that might weight in as the size of the project,
or the type of project. Moreover, we control for different kind of firm, district, and
time-period unobservables using a broad set of fixed effects.
Table 3.5: Entry and Bidding Behavior of Weak Firms
Dependent Variable 1{submit a bid} log(bid)
# of strong non-participating -0.0179** -0.0266** -0.0272** 0.0152** 0.0011 -0.0036
firms on the same list (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0072)
# of strong participating -0.0310** -0.0298** -0.0055 -0.0115
firms on the same list (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0069) (0.0068)
1{no other projects} 0.0138** 0.0033
(0.0053) (0.0092)
Engineer’s cost estimate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Type Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.377 0.395 0.396 0.972 0.976 0.977
N 33556 33556 33556 6216 6216 6216
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that plan requests are not
only used by firms to acquire information about projects’ characteristics but also to
separate the markets by sending a signal of entry to weak firms.
In columns (4) to (6), we examine whether the entry signal mechanism is also
carried on to the bidding behavior of smaller firms. We regress the logarithm of the
bidding score submitted by these firms on the number of strong non-participating
firms, and the same series of controls as in the first three columns. In this case,
there does not seem to be any effect of the non-participating big firms to the bidding
patterns of weak contractors after controlling for the actual entry. This finding is in
line with the initial hypothesis: entry signals lose any effect on smaller contractors
once parties have revealed entry behavior.
3.5.2 Signal of entry
Once having shown empirical evidence of small firms reacting to the possibility of
entry by big firms, we focus on the signals of entry. In Table 3.6, we present a linear
probability model of entry for weak and strong bidders regressed on a broad set of
observables and fixed effects to control for unobservables. One first aspect to notice
is that the impact of strong potential bidders on weak bidders remains throughout
all specifications at around a 2%.
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The parameters of the linear and squared term for the bidder utilization rate
show that there are two groups with reduced entry into auctions. There is a large
set of weak bidders that never win a project, and have very low utilization rates.
These bidders have a lower probability of entry that is reflected in the coefficients.
Other bidders do win projects and have utilization rates close to 1. These bidders
also have a lower probability of entry mostly because they have low free capacity to
employ.
Table 3.6: Entry Behavior by Firm Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1{submit a bid} - Weak Bidders 1{submit a bid} - Strong Bidders
# of weak potential -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003***
entrants (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of strong potential -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.012 -0.011 -0.010
entrants (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Bidder Utilization Rate 1.829*** 1.830*** 1.827*** 2.219*** 2.219*** 2.206***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
(Bidder Utilization Rate)2 -1.527*** -1.527*** -1.525*** -2.093*** -2.089*** -2.078***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
# of projects requested -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.007***
simultaneously (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
FDOT Utilization Rate -0.024** -0.024** -0.012 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.027) (0.026)
Close Project 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.107*** 0.105***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020)
Contract Duration 0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Type Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Square 0.549 0.550 0.551 0.817 0.819 0.820
N 33556 33535 33521 4139 4137 4137
The parameter of interest in table 3.6 is the one associated with the number of
simultaneous project plans requested. This variable is the number of project plans
that the bidder requested for projects in the same district auctioned within a time
window of three days before and after the auction. We group these projects because
they have letting processes that occur relatively parallel to each other.
The coefficients for this variable both for weak and strong bidders are negative
and significant. The sign means that the probability of entry by a bidder is lower the
more projects it has shown interest in at the same time. We can invert the reasoning
and interpret these results in terms of information. The negative coefficient implies
that a bidder requesting few project plans is more likely to enter in these projects,
and that certainty reduces the more plans the bidder requests. The effect is sizable
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for strong bidders with a reduction of a 0.7% for each plan requested in the same
district.
It is interesting to join together the evidence of Tables 3.5 and 3.6. We showed in
Table 3.5 that requesting a plan by big contractors reduces the contesting of small
firms. The natural question taking this evidence face value is why does every strong
bidder not request a plan for every project if it reduces its competition.
We complete this picture in Table 3.6. A high number of plans decreases the
threat of entry by the firm requesting them. In other terms, if every strong bidder
would request a plan for every available project, this signal would not be effective,
and the effect on auction entry explored in Table 3.5 would not be as significant as
it is currently.
3.5.3 Substitution across projects
We have shown that there exists evidence of strong contractors using their plan
requests to signal their interest in specific projects. However, the channel through
which these actions become valid signals requires profound inspection, since the cost
of requesting a plan is none in itself.
In this subsection, we look for empirical evidence for the channel that we propose
in the model of section 3.4. In it, foregoing a second project gives a signal to the rivals
of the firm in a first project since there exists some substitution across projects. This
substitution is present in the form of a less competitive bidding behavior for firms
that are bidding more aggressively in other projects. In this manner, a bidder that
decides not to bid in some project is probably also going to bid more aggressively
in those projects that it can enter.
We propose the following simple approach to test for this mechanism in our
data. First, we approximate the bidding distribution function for both strong and
weak constructors using a complete reduced form regression that controls for many
aspects that affect bidding behavior. After getting these bid distributions, we add
to them the number of other simultaneous projects for which the firm has entered
the auction.
We expect the sign for the coefficient of this last regressor to be positive to back
our hypothesis of substitution across projects. Were it positive, it would imply that
the more auctions a firm enters simultaneously, the least competitive it becomes in
each of them.
We model the reduced-form bidding function as a linear function of its regressors
and account for two main types of endogeneity that might arise in this setup. First,
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bidding depends on the number and identity of rival firms that have decided to
participate in the auction, and the firms themselves decide this entry. There is a
high probability that the unobservables that make a contractor bid aggressively are
also the reason why many other contractors choose to submit a bid. This kind of
endogeneity would lead us to overstate the competitive effects across firms in the
procurement process.
Second, each observation that we have is a result of the decision of a firm to enter
an auction. This remark also implies that we could probably have many missing
observations that correspond to firms that would have submitted a less competitive
bid, but decided instead not to submit any at all. This issue of selection would
overestimate the competitiveness of firms when submitting their proposals.
We account for the selection effect using a selection model based on Heckman
(1979). Let X and W be vectors of project and bidder characteristics, while the
attributes in W are exogenous, the ones in X might be endogenous. For us to
observe a bid, a firm should have decided to enter the auction and to participate in
it. We define the variable SUBMIT BID as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
latent variable y is positive and 0 otherwise. We define additionally Z to be a set
of exogenous variables relevant for entry. We consider the following equations
y = Zγ1 +Wγ2 + y,
log(bid) = Xβ1 +Wβ2 + b,
X = Zpi1 +Wpi2 + x.
The first equation is the entry equation, and the second is the one of interest.
The third equation regresses the endogenous characteristics over a set of exogenous
variables for an instrumental variables approach. We assume β, γ, and pi to be
vectors of parameters to estimate. Finally, we take y, b, and x as zero-mean
normal random unobservables with Var(y) = 1, Var(x) = σ
2
x, and Var(b) = σ
2
b .
We assume all the correlations to be 0, except Corr(b, y) = ρby to be estimated.
This setup allows us to regress for the bids using our selected sample. We get a
closed form expression for the conditional expectation of the log(bid)
E[log(bid)|SUBMIT BID = 1, Z] = Xβ1 +Wβ2 + ρbyσ φ(Zγ1 +Wγ2)
Φ(Zγ1 +Wγ2)
, (3.1)
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the probability density and cumulative distribution func-
tions of a standard normal random variable, and their ratio constitute what is nor-
mally referred as the inverse Mills’ ratio. We expect the parameter ρby to be negative
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because less competitive firms (with higher potential bids) would tend to shy out
from submitting a bid.
We estimate this model in two stages. In the first stage, we regress the endogenous
variables on the exogenous characteristics and estimate the entry equation as a
Probit model. We get estimates Xˆ, and ˆφ(·)/ ˆΦ(·) from these first-stage regressions.
In the second stage, we regress the log(bid) on the different exogenous variables,
the predicted Xˆ, and the predicted inverse Mills’ ratio. We bootstrap our standard
errors to account for the additional noise added by the predicted variables in the
first stage of the estimation.
For the identification of our parameters to work in this model, we need as many
excluded variables as the number of endogenous variables plus an additional one for
the entry equation. It is difficult to find many such variables in such a strategic
environment as this one. In what follows, we propose a series of instruments using
our institutional framework and discuss their limitations.
We propose to use the number of potential bidders, the number of simultaneous
projects requested by the bidder, and the estimated cost of all concurrent projects
as excluded variables for our estimation. The number of potential bidders is an
endogenous variable since the firms themselves also decide them. After all prospec-
tive bidders choose whether to enter the auction and submit a bid, this decision is
observed by every competitor, and the status as a potential bidder is no longer rele-
vant. For this reason, the relevance of the number of prospective bidders affects the
bidding strategies only through the actual number of bidders, making it a suitable
instrument. The number of simultaneous project requests follows a similar line of
argument as the total number of potential bidders.
The total projected costs of all simultaneous projects let in a time window of 3
days should approximate for the opportunity cost that a contractor faces when de-
ciding to contest for one project and foregoing another one. We need to assume that
the set of projects posted every month by the FDOT are exogenous for this vari-
able to work as a valid instrument. An example that might violate this assumption
would be if the FDOT released its list of projects to procure in separate packages
of complementary contractible units at the beginning of the month.
We show the results of our regressions in Table 3.7. The first four columns
correspond to specifications including only weak bidders, while the last four columns
include only strong bidders. In each of the two sets of four columns, there are
different estimation strategies. The first one corresponds to a na¨ıve least squares
estimation of the logarithm of the bid on a series of regressors. The second column
84
Table 3.7: Bidding Behavior by Firm Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV IV+Heck IV+Heck OLS IV IV+Heck IV+Heck
Log(Bid) - Weak Bidders Log(Bid) - Strong Bidders
# Weak -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.013** -0.011* -0.011**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
# Strong -0.018*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
% Bidder Utilization 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053** 0.068*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.052** 0.059**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
% FDOT Utilization -0.056*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.035* -0.032 -0.031 -0.033
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Log(Contract duration) 0.070*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.183*** 0.182***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Close Project -0.029** -0.031*** -0.029** -0.023* -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 -0.020
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Inverse Mills -0.015 0.007 -0.011 0.000
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)
# Proj. Entered 0.038*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.003)
# Proj. Won -0.052*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.003)
Engineer’s cost estimate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Type Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Test (Weak) 2259.51 2259.51 2330.65 302.05 302.05 301.88
F-Test (Strong) 7934.36 7934.36 7924.95 806.71 806.71 840.45
χ-Test (Entry) 557.29 544.17 15.83 104.45
Adj. R-Square 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N 6213 6213 6213 6213 2987 2987 2987 2987
uses the instruments discussed before to account for the endogeneity of the number of
participants. Finally, the third and fourth columns combine the use of instruments
with the Heckman selection technique. The F-Tests and χ-Tests for instrument
relevance of the first stages are reported in the lower part of the table.2
The regression coefficients for weak bidders are all in line with the general intu-
ition. Weak firms react to a higher number of competitors by submitting a more
competitive bid. This effect is more pronounced when the entrants are strong bid-
ders. Specifically, weak bidders decrease their bids by a 2.3% for every additional
strong participant as opposed to a 1.5% - 1.7% for every additional weak firm. They
also tend to bid more competitively when the project is in the same district as their
headquarters. Conversely, they bid less aggressively for long projects, and even when
they are working at high capacity. The results look qualitatively similar for strong
bidders except for their competitive effects. They seem not to be reacting at all to
the presence of other strong firms bidding in the same auction.
The most interesting parameters are the ones at the end of Table 3.7 in columns
(3), (4), (7), and (8). The coefficient on the inverse Mills’ ratio is in neither of
2The first stage regressions can be found in Tables 14 and 15 of the appendix.
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the columns significant. We would have expected it to have a significantly negative
coefficient that implied that the bidders left out of the auction to be those that
would have submitted less competitive bids. This lack of significance is in line with
the standard modeling assumption in the structural literature where unobservable
shocks to entry costs are independent of shocks to bidding strategies.
Finally, the last two coefficients are the number of simultaneous auctions entered,
and the number of simultaneous auctions won by the bidder. We are interested
mainly in the first one. We could interpret its coefficient as the impact that un-
successful entry into other auctions happening at the same time have on bidding
behavior. Its positive and significant estimate implies that entering to another con-
current auction and not winning it is associated with less competitive bidding by the
firm in other projects. In quantitative terms, a weak contractor that participates
unsuccessfully in another letting auction increases its bid by a 3.8%, while a strong
contractor does so by a 1%.
We understand these results only as weak suggestive evidence of substitution
across projects. First of all, there is little room for causal claims in such a strategic
environment. Moreover, we find less competitive bidding for unsuccessful bids, which
is a selected subsample of all bids.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we inspect the role of information design in procurement auctions.
We use data from transport infrastructure auctions in Florida that contain not
only the bids from all auction participants, but also the identity and number of all
firms interested in a project. The list of interested firms is publicly known and no
contractor can submit a bid without first qualifying as a potential bidder.
We use our data to analyze how common knowledge of the list of potential en-
trants affects the development of the letting process. In particular, we look at the
possibility that strong bidders might use this institutional feature to signal interest
in some projects and keep competition away from them.
We develop a stylized framework of the letting process to illustrate how a contrac-
tor could commit to giving up participating in some auctions to signal strongly that
it wants to participate actively in other auctions. We then test for these predictions
in our data.
We find strong evidence that knowing the list of potential entrants affects entry
behavior in these procurement auctions. A normal bidder reduces its participation
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probability in a project by around 2.7% when an additional prominent bidder is in
the list of potential entrants.
Furthermore, we find evidence that this information transmission is built upon
the choice of projects for which a firm wants to appear as a potential bidder. In
other words, a bidder that chooses to appear as a contender for many projects is less
likely to enter any of them, whereas a bidder that shows interest in very few projects
is expected to be more prone to submit a bid. Our estimates show that a strong
bidder that request information for an additional project reduces its probability to
enter any of the projects he is a potential bidder for by 0.7%.
After showing the existence of entry signals and their substantial effect in auction
participation, we turn our attention to finding the mechanism that allows for this
behavior in equilibrium. In particular, we propose that there exist some substitution
effect among projects that reduces the competitiveness for a contractor submitting
bids for several auctions at the same time. We test for this mechanism and find
weak evidence of it. Each unsuccessful bid for a simultaneous project increases by
a 3.8% and a 1% the bid score for weak and strong bidders respectively.
Our work is the first one to pay attention to the institutional design of information
in project procurement and finds that it has sizable effects on participation and
bidding behavior. We provide a different insight compared to much of the existing
literature. While it is essential to detect potential collusive behavior among bidders,
it is also vital to prevent the institutional framework to facilitate coordination among
bidders. The optimal information design and the monetary cost of this coordination
could be better quantified estimating a structural model.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Table 8: Predicted Number of Dealers by Manufacurer
After
Brand Obs. Elimination Eq’m
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
ALFA ROMEO 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.030 (0.171)
AUDI 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.000 (0.000)
BMW 3.000 3.000 (0.000) 3.000 (0.000)
CITROEN / DS 9.000 6.775 (0.418) 6.775 (0.418)
FIAT 3.000 3.000 (0.000) 3.000 (0.000)
FORD 6.000 5.000 (0.000) 5.000 (0.000)
HONDA 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.105 (0.307)
HYUNDAI 4.000 3.000 (0.000) 2.490 (0.500)
INFINITI 1.000 1.000 (0.000) 1.970 (0.243)
JAGUAR 2.000 1.000 (0.000) 2.000 (0.000)
JEEP 1.000 1.000 (0.000) 2.110 (0.313)
KIA 4.000 4.000 (0.000) 4.000 (0.000)
LAND ROVER 2.000 1.000 (0.000) 2.000 (0.000)
MAZDA 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.080 (0.271)
MERCEDES BENZ 3.000 3.000 (0.000) 3.000 (0.000)
MINI 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.000 (0.000)
MITSUBISHI 3.000 3.000 (0.000) 2.235 (0.424)
NISSAN 3.000 3.000 (0.000) 3.000 (0.000)
OPEL 6.000 5.000 (0.000) 5.000 (0.000)
PEUGEOT 9.000 5.640 (0.641) 5.640 (0.641)
PORSCHE 1.000 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000)
RENAULT / DACIA 13.000 5.995 (0.908) 5.995 (0.908)
SEAT 7.000 4.180 (0.384) 4.180 (0.384)
SKODA 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.000 (0.000)
SMART 1.000 1.000 (0.000) 1.700 (0.458)
SSANGYONG 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.040 (0.196)
SUBARU 3.000 3.000 (0.000) 2.010 (0.099)
SUZUKI 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.185 (0.388)
TOYOTA 3.000 3.000 (0.000) 3.000 (0.000)
VOLKSWAGEN 4.000 4.000 (0.000) 4.000 (0.000)
VOLVO 2.000 2.000 (0.000) 2.000 (0.000)
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Table 9: Predicted Sales by Car Model (Part 1)
After
Model Obs. Elimination Eq’m
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
ALFA ROMEO GIULIA 0.0881 0.0233 (0.0031) 0.1592 (0.0061)
ALFA ROMEO GIULIETTA 0.1304 0.0344 (0.0031) 0.2356 (0.0061)
ALFA ROMEO MITO 0.0279 0.0074 (0.0031) 0.0505 (0.0061)
ALFA ROMEO STELVIO 0.1882 0.0497 (0.0031) 0.3401 (0.0061)
AUDI A1 0.1453 0.0385 (0.0034) 0.0357 (0.0034)
AUDI A3 0.2421 0.0642 (0.0034) 0.0595 (0.0034)
AUDI A4 0.1268 0.0336 (0.0034) 0.0312 (0.0034)
AUDI A5 0.1272 0.0337 (0.0034) 0.0313 (0.0034)
AUDI A6 0.0842 0.0223 (0.0034) 0.0207 (0.0034)
AUDI A7 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0034) 0.0000 (0.0034)
AUDI A8 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0034) 0.0000 (0.0034)
AUDI Q2 0.1146 0.0304 (0.0034) 0.0282 (0.0034)
AUDI Q3 0.2615 0.0693 (0.0034) 0.0643 (0.0034)
AUDI Q5 0.1411 0.0374 (0.0034) 0.0347 (0.0034)
AUDI Q7 0.1404 0.0372 (0.0034) 0.0345 (0.0034)
AUDI TT 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0034) 0.0000 (0.0034)
BMW SERIE 1 0.3053 0.0812 (0.0026) 0.0756 (0.0027)
BMW SERIE 2 0.2984 0.0793 (0.0026) 0.0739 (0.0027)
BMW SERIE 3 0.4557 0.1211 (0.0026) 0.1129 (0.0027)
BMW SERIE 4 0.1657 0.0440 (0.0026) 0.0410 (0.0027)
BMW SERIE 5 0.3696 0.0983 (0.0026) 0.0916 (0.0027)
BMW SERIE 6 0.0675 0.0180 (0.0026) 0.0167 (0.0027)
BMW SERIE 7 0.3051 0.0811 (0.0026) 0.0756 (0.0027)
BMW X1 0.7097 0.1887 (0.0026) 0.1758 (0.0027)
BMW X3 0.5692 0.1513 (0.0026) 0.1410 (0.0027)
BMW X4 0.4696 0.1248 (0.0026) 0.1163 (0.0027)
BMW X5 0.1084 0.0288 (0.0026) 0.0268 (0.0027)
BMW X6 0.0807 0.0215 (0.0026) 0.0200 (0.0027)
CITROEN BERLINGO 0.5776 0.6810 (0.0184) 0.6336 (0.0183)
CITROEN C-ELYSEE 0.8048 0.9488 (0.0184) 0.8828 (0.0183)
CITROEN C1 0.0239 0.0282 (0.0184) 0.0263 (0.0183)
CITROEN C3 1.0969 1.2931 (0.0184) 1.2033 (0.0183)
CITROEN C4 1.9116 2.2536 (0.0184) 2.0970 (0.0183)
CITROEN C4 AIRCROSS 0.3001 0.3538 (0.0184) 0.3292 (0.0183)
CITROEN C4 CACTUS 0.4876 0.5748 (0.0184) 0.5349 (0.0183)
CITROEN C4 PICASSO 1.6029 1.8897 (0.0184) 1.7584 (0.0183)
CITROEN C5 0.0910 0.1073 (0.0184) 0.0999 (0.0183)
CITROEN NEMO 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0184) 0.0000 (0.0183)
RENAULT DOKKER 0.5998 0.5921 (0.0268) 0.5509 (0.0267)
RENAULT DUSTER 6.5537 6.4689 (0.0268) 6.0190 (0.0267)
RENAULT LODGY 0.2900 0.2862 (0.0268) 0.2663 (0.0267)
RENAULT LOGAN 0.2315 0.2285 (0.0268) 0.2126 (0.0267)
RENAULT SANDERO 2.4223 2.3910 (0.0268) 2.2247 (0.0267)
CITROEN DS3 0.0826 0.0973 (0.0184) 0.0906 (0.0183)
CITROEN DS4 0.2252 0.2655 (0.0184) 0.2470 (0.0183)
CITROEN DS5 0.2456 0.2895 (0.0184) 0.2694 (0.0183)
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Table 10: Predicted Sales by Car Model (Part 2)
After
Model Obs. Elimination Eq’m
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
FIAT 124 SPIDER 0.0661 0.0177 (0.0022) 0.0165 (0.0023)
FIAT 500 0.2439 0.0652 (0.0022) 0.0609 (0.0023)
FIAT 500L 0.0695 0.0186 (0.0022) 0.0173 (0.0023)
FIAT 500X 0.2122 0.0567 (0.0022) 0.0529 (0.0023)
FIAT DOBLO 0.0324 0.0087 (0.0022) 0.0081 (0.0023)
FIAT PANDA 0.1103 0.0295 (0.0022) 0.0275 (0.0023)
FIAT PUNTO 0.4644 0.1241 (0.0022) 0.1159 (0.0023)
FIAT TIPO 0.4902 0.1310 (0.0022) 0.1223 (0.0023)
FORD B-MAX 0.0183 0.0235 (0.0033) 0.0219 (0.0033)
FORD C-MAX 0.0946 0.1215 (0.0033) 0.1130 (0.0033)
FORD ECOSPORT 0.1479 0.1899 (0.0033) 0.1766 (0.0033)
FORD EDGE 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0033) 0.0000 (0.0033)
FORD FIESTA 0.1855 0.2382 (0.0033) 0.2215 (0.0033)
FORD FOCUS 1.4967 1.9213 (0.0033) 1.7871 (0.0033)
FORD GALAXY 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0033) 0.0000 (0.0033)
FORD KA 0.2611 0.3351 (0.0033) 0.3117 (0.0033)
FORD KUGA 0.2914 0.3741 (0.0033) 0.3479 (0.0033)
FORD MONDEO 0.1353 0.1737 (0.0033) 0.1615 (0.0033)
FORD S-MAX 0.0458 0.0588 (0.0033) 0.0547 (0.0033)
FORD TOURNEO CONNECT 0.0244 0.0313 (0.0033) 0.0291 (0.0033)
FORD TOURNEO COURIER 0.2827 0.3629 (0.0033) 0.3375 (0.0033)
HONDA CIVIC 0.0159 0.0042 (0.0034) 0.0265 (0.0078)
HONDA CR-V 0.0332 0.0088 (0.0034) 0.0552 (0.0078)
HONDA HR-V 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0034) 0.0000 (0.0078)
HONDA JAZZ 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0034) 0.0000 (0.0078)
HYUNDAI ELANTRA 0.1452 0.1924 (0.0036) 0.1720 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI GRAND SANTA FE 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0036) 0.0000 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI I10 0.1488 0.1972 (0.0036) 0.1763 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI I20 0.5089 0.6744 (0.0036) 0.6030 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI I30 1.3205 1.7499 (0.0036) 1.5645 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI I40 0.1122 0.1487 (0.0036) 0.1330 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI IONIQ 0.1815 0.2405 (0.0036) 0.2150 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI IX20 0.0212 0.0280 (0.0036) 0.0251 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI SANTA FE 0.0552 0.0731 (0.0036) 0.0654 (0.0074)
HYUNDAI TUCSON 8.8504 11.7283 (0.0036) 10.4860 (0.0074)
INFINITI Q30 0.0430 0.0112 (0.0044) 0.1243 (0.0174)
INFINITI Q50 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0044) 0.0000 (0.0174)
INFINITI QX30 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0044) 0.0000 (0.0174)
JAGUAR F-PACE 0.0353 0.1171 (0.0023) 0.1226 (0.0106)
JAGUAR XE 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0023) 0.0000 (0.0106)
JAGUAR XF 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0023) 0.0000 (0.0106)
JEEP CHEROKEE 0.0262 0.0070 (0.0033) 0.1161 (0.0047)
JEEP GRAND CHEROKEE 0.0731 0.0196 (0.0033) 0.3242 (0.0047)
JEEP RENEGADE 0.4122 0.1106 (0.0033) 1.8279 (0.0047)
JEEP WRANGLER 0.0079 0.0021 (0.0033) 0.0351 (0.0047)
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Table 11: Predicted Sales by Car Model (Part 3)
After
Model Obs. Elimination Eq’m
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
KIA CARENS 0.4498 0.6040 (0.0017) 0.5618 (0.0017)
KIA CEE’D 0.8137 1.0927 (0.0017) 1.0162 (0.0017)
KIA NIRO 0.3073 0.4126 (0.0017) 0.3837 (0.0017)
KIA OPTIMA 0.0549 0.0737 (0.0017) 0.0685 (0.0017)
KIA PICANTO 0.1422 0.1910 (0.0017) 0.1776 (0.0017)
KIA RIO 0.3126 0.4198 (0.0017) 0.3904 (0.0017)
KIA SORENTO 0.6223 0.8356 (0.0017) 0.7772 (0.0017)
KIA SOUL 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0017) 0.0000 (0.0017)
KIA SPORTAGE 2.4547 3.2962 (0.0017) 3.0656 (0.0017)
KIA VENGA 0.0446 0.0599 (0.0017) 0.0558 (0.0017)
LAND ROVER DISCOVERY 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0024) 0.0000 (0.0092)
LAND ROVER DISCOVERY SPORT 0.0467 0.1551 (0.0024) 0.1633 (0.0092)
LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0024) 0.0000 (0.0092)
LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER EVOQUE 0.0996 0.3305 (0.0024) 0.3480 (0.0092)
LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER SPORT 0.0150 0.0499 (0.0024) 0.0525 (0.0092)
LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER VELAR 0.0300 0.0996 (0.0024) 0.1049 (0.0092)
MAZDA CX-3 0.1097 0.0291 (0.0031) 0.2107 (0.0087)
MAZDA CX-5 0.1452 0.0384 (0.0031) 0.2788 (0.0087)
MAZDA MAZDA2 0.3396 0.0899 (0.0031) 0.6524 (0.0087)
MAZDA MAZDA3 0.0746 0.0198 (0.0031) 0.1433 (0.0087)
MAZDA MAZDA6 0.1020 0.0270 (0.0031) 0.1960 (0.0087)
MAZDA MX-5 0.0234 0.0062 (0.0031) 0.0449 (0.0087)
MERCEDES BENZ CITAN 0.0216 0.0058 (0.0029) 0.0054 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE A 0.7681 0.2041 (0.0029) 0.1902 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE B 0.0526 0.0140 (0.0029) 0.0130 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE C 0.2895 0.0769 (0.0029) 0.0717 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE CLA 0.5610 0.1491 (0.0029) 0.1389 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE CLS 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0029) 0.0000 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE E 0.1030 0.0274 (0.0029) 0.0255 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE GLA 0.4646 0.1235 (0.0029) 0.1150 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE GLC 0.3837 0.1020 (0.0029) 0.0950 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE GLE 0.0952 0.0253 (0.0029) 0.0236 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE GLS 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0029) 0.0000 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE S 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0029) 0.0000 (0.0029)
MERCEDES BENZ CLASE SLC 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0029) 0.0000 (0.0029)
MINI 5 PUERTAS 0.0427 0.0113 (0.0031) 0.0772 (0.0018)
MINI CABRIO 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0031) 0.0000 (0.0018)
MINI CLUBMAN 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0031) 0.0000 (0.0018)
MINI COUNTRYMAN 0.1090 0.0288 (0.0031) 0.1972 (0.0018)
MINI HATCH 0.0290 0.0077 (0.0031) 0.0525 (0.0018)
MINI PACEMAN 0.0429 0.0113 (0.0031) 0.0776 (0.0018)
MITSUBISHI ASX 0.4562 0.1212 (0.0029) 0.5243 (0.0099)
MITSUBISHI MONTERO 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0029) 0.0000 (0.0099)
MITSUBISHI OUTLANDER 0.1256 0.0334 (0.0029) 0.1443 (0.0099)
MITSUBISHI SPACE STAR 0.0161 0.0043 (0.0029) 0.0185 (0.0099)
NISSAN 370Z 0.0207 0.0298 (0.0018) 0.0277 (0.0018)
NISSAN JUKE 1.0894 1.5684 (0.0018) 1.4581 (0.0018)
NISSAN MICRA 0.1649 0.2374 (0.0018) 0.2207 (0.0018)
NISSAN NOTE 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0018) 0.0000 (0.0018)
NISSAN PULSAR 0.1122 0.1615 (0.0018) 0.1501 (0.0018)
NISSAN QASHQAI 0.9973 1.4358 (0.0018) 1.3348 (0.0018)
NISSAN X-TRAIL 0.7589 1.0925 (0.0018) 1.0157 (0.0018)
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Table 12: Predicted Sales by Car Model (Part 4)
After
Model Obs. Elimination Eq’m
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
OPEL ADAM 0.0581 0.0591 (0.0044) 0.0549 (0.0044)
OPEL ASTRA 1.8106 1.8418 (0.0044) 1.7132 (0.0044)
OPEL CORSA 0.6486 0.6598 (0.0044) 0.6137 (0.0044)
OPEL CROSSLAND X 0.1586 0.1613 (0.0044) 0.1501 (0.0044)
OPEL INSIGNIA 0.5383 0.5475 (0.0044) 0.5093 (0.0044)
OPEL KARL 0.0718 0.0730 (0.0044) 0.0679 (0.0044)
OPEL MERIVA 0.0285 0.0290 (0.0044) 0.0270 (0.0044)
OPEL MOKKA X 0.7017 0.7138 (0.0044) 0.6640 (0.0044)
OPEL ZAFIRA 0.2469 0.2512 (0.0044) 0.2336 (0.0044)
PEUGEOT 108 0.1336 0.1438 (0.0219) 0.1338 (0.0219)
PEUGEOT 2008 1.0025 1.0796 (0.0219) 1.0042 (0.0219)
PEUGEOT 208 0.7297 0.7858 (0.0219) 0.7309 (0.0219)
PEUGEOT 3008 0.5591 0.6021 (0.0219) 0.5600 (0.0219)
PEUGEOT 308 1.5152 1.6317 (0.0219) 1.5177 (0.0219)
PEUGEOT 5008 0.3171 0.3415 (0.0219) 0.3176 (0.0219)
PEUGEOT 508 0.2158 0.2324 (0.0219) 0.2161 (0.0219)
PEUGEOT BIPPER 0.0551 0.0593 (0.0219) 0.0552 (0.0219)
PEUGEOT PARTNER 0.3726 0.4012 (0.0219) 0.3732 (0.0219)
PORSCHE 718 BOXSTER 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0040) 0.0000 (0.0098)
PORSCHE 718 CAYMAN 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0040) 0.0000 (0.0098)
PORSCHE CAYENNE 0.0424 0.0115 (0.0040) 0.1495 (0.0098)
PORSCHE MACAN 0.0116 0.0031 (0.0040) 0.0408 (0.0098)
PORSCHE PANAMERA 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0040) 0.0000 (0.0098)
RENAULT CAPTUR 1.3304 1.3131 (0.0268) 1.2218 (0.0267)
RENAULT CLIO 4.4840 4.4259 (0.0268) 4.1181 (0.0267)
RENAULT ESPACE 0.1996 0.1970 (0.0268) 0.1833 (0.0267)
RENAULT KADJAR 1.7018 1.6797 (0.0268) 1.5629 (0.0267)
RENAULT KANGOO 0.8244 0.8138 (0.0268) 0.7572 (0.0267)
RENAULT MEGANE 8.2994 8.1920 (0.0268) 7.6222 (0.0267)
RENAULT SCENIC 2.1192 2.0918 (0.0268) 1.9463 (0.0267)
RENAULT TALISMAN 0.2498 0.2466 (0.0268) 0.2294 (0.0267)
RENAULT TWINGO 0.1340 0.1323 (0.0268) 0.1231 (0.0267)
SEAT ALHAMBRA 0.0304 0.0381 (0.0073) 0.0355 (0.0073)
SEAT ATECA 1.0322 1.2953 (0.0073) 1.2049 (0.0073)
SEAT IBIZA 3.2434 4.0704 (0.0073) 3.7861 (0.0073)
SEAT LEON 2.0625 2.5885 (0.0073) 2.4077 (0.0073)
SEAT MII 0.0452 0.0567 (0.0073) 0.0527 (0.0073)
SEAT TOLEDO 0.0391 0.0490 (0.0073) 0.0456 (0.0073)
SKODA CITIGO 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0018) 0.0000 (0.0018)
SKODA FABIA 0.1825 0.3921 (0.0018) 0.3643 (0.0018)
SKODA KODIAQ 0.4079 0.8763 (0.0018) 0.8142 (0.0018)
SKODA OCTAVIA 0.1442 0.3098 (0.0018) 0.2878 (0.0018)
SKODA RAPID 0.4475 0.9612 (0.0018) 0.8931 (0.0018)
SKODA SUPERB 0.1625 0.3492 (0.0018) 0.3244 (0.0018)
SKODA YETI 0.0402 0.0864 (0.0018) 0.0803 (0.0018)
SMART FORFOUR 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0034) 0.0000 (0.0274)
SMART FORTWO 0.0052 0.0014 (0.0034) 0.0243 (0.0274)
SSANGYONG KORANDO 0.0753 0.0199 (0.0031) 0.1360 (0.0039)
SSANGYONG REXTON W 0.3393 0.0896 (0.0031) 0.6125 (0.0039)
SSANGYONG RODIUS 0.0503 0.0133 (0.0031) 0.0908 (0.0039)
SSANGYONG TIVOLI 0.2705 0.0714 (0.0031) 0.4883 (0.0039)
SSANGYONG XLV 0.0153 0.0040 (0.0031) 0.0276 (0.0039)
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Table 13: Predicted Sales by Car Model (Part 5)
After
Model Obs. Elimination Eq’m
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
SUBARU FORESTER 0.0237 0.0063 (0.0026) 0.0297 (0.0042)
SUBARU LEGACY 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0026) 0.0000 (0.0042)
SUBARU LEVORG 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0026) 0.0000 (0.0042)
SUBARU OUTBACK 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0026) 0.0000 (0.0042)
SUBARU WRX STI 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0026) 0.0000 (0.0042)
SUBARU XV 0.0242 0.0064 (0.0026) 0.0305 (0.0042)
SUZUKI BALENO 0.0215 0.0057 (0.0036) 0.0262 (0.0112)
SUZUKI CELERIO 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0036) 0.0000 (0.0112)
SUZUKI IGNIS 0.1520 0.0400 (0.0036) 0.1847 (0.0112)
SUZUKI JIMNY 0.1543 0.0406 (0.0036) 0.1874 (0.0112)
SUZUKI SWIFT 0.0788 0.0207 (0.0036) 0.0958 (0.0112)
SUZUKI SX4 0.0674 0.0177 (0.0036) 0.0819 (0.0112)
SUZUKI VITARA 0.3046 0.0802 (0.0036) 0.3700 (0.0112)
TOYOTA AURIS 1.1288 0.3006 (0.0026) 0.2802 (0.0026)
TOYOTA AVENSIS 0.1616 0.0430 (0.0026) 0.0401 (0.0026)
TOYOTA AYGO 0.3830 0.1020 (0.0026) 0.0951 (0.0026)
TOYOTA C-HR 0.3129 0.0833 (0.0026) 0.0777 (0.0026)
TOYOTA GT86 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0026) 0.0000 (0.0026)
TOYOTA LAND CRUISER 0.2298 0.0612 (0.0026) 0.0570 (0.0026)
TOYOTA PRIUS 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0026) 0.0000 (0.0026)
TOYOTA VERSO 0.1888 0.0503 (0.0026) 0.0469 (0.0026)
TOYOTA YARIS 0.7448 0.1983 (0.0026) 0.1849 (0.0026)
VOLKSWAGEN ARTEON 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0025) 0.0000 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN BEETLE 0.0505 0.0134 (0.0025) 0.0125 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN CADDY 0.0783 0.0208 (0.0025) 0.0194 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN CC 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0025) 0.0000 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN GOLF 0.9619 0.2556 (0.0025) 0.2380 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN JETTA 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0025) 0.0000 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN PASSAT 0.2082 0.0553 (0.0025) 0.0515 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN POLO 0.3684 0.0979 (0.0025) 0.0912 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN SCIROCCO 0.1176 0.0312 (0.0025) 0.0291 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN SHARAN 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0025) 0.0000 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN TIGUAN 0.6193 0.1645 (0.0025) 0.1532 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN TOUAREG 0.1207 0.0321 (0.0025) 0.0299 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN TOURAN 0.8635 0.2294 (0.0025) 0.2137 (0.0025)
VOLKSWAGEN UP! 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0025) 0.0000 (0.0025)
VOLVO S60 0.0729 0.1340 (0.0018) 0.1245 (0.0018)
VOLVO S90 0.0659 0.1211 (0.0018) 0.1125 (0.0018)
VOLVO V40 0.1985 0.3650 (0.0018) 0.3391 (0.0018)
VOLVO V60 0.2976 0.5472 (0.0018) 0.5084 (0.0018)
VOLVO V90 0.0378 0.0695 (0.0018) 0.0646 (0.0018)
VOLVO XC60 1.8696 3.4377 (0.0018) 3.1938 (0.0018)
VOLVO XC90 0.1136 0.2090 (0.0018) 0.1941 (0.0018)
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table 14: First Stage Regressions for Weak Bidders
FS #Weak FS #Strong FS Probit FS #Weak FS #Strong FS Probit
# Weak Potential 0.159*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 0.160*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
# Strong Potential -0.301*** 0.608*** -0.189*** -0.285*** 0.608*** -0.194***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012)
Sum of Concurrent -0.005 -0.016*** 0.078*** -0.044*** -0.013*** 0.060***
Project Costs (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013) (0.004) (0.009)
% Bidder Utilization 0.743*** -0.003 6.178*** 0.122 -0.005 6.022***
(0.081) (0.027) (0.214) (0.083) (0.028) (0.216)
(% Bidder Utilization)2 -5.105*** -4.989***
(0.244) (0.246)
% FDOT Utilization -0.617*** 0.039** -0.339*** -0.594*** 0.044** -0.364***
(0.057) (0.019) (0.052) (0.056) (0.019) (0.053)
Log(Contract duration) 0.801*** -0.223*** -0.016 0.805*** -0.225*** -0.023***
(0.038) (0.013) (0.032) (0.038) (0.013) (0.033)
Close Project -0.061 0.032** 0.203*** -0.093*** 0.035*** 0.180
(0.040) (0.013) (0.035) (0.038) (0.013) (0.035)
# Proj. Entered 0.614*** 0.005 0.075***
(0.022) (0.007) (0.003)
# Proj. Won -0.600*** -0.018**
(0.022) (0.007)
Engineer’s cost estimate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Type Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Square 0.538 0.668 0.539 0.698
N 33,521 33,521 33,521 33,521 33,521 33,521
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Table 15: First Stage Regressions for Strong Bidders
FS #Weak FS #Strong FS Probit FS #Weak FS #Strong FS Probit
# Weak Potential -0.143*** -0.012*** -0.000 0.143*** -0.011*** -0.007**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
# Strong Potential 0.137*** 0.644*** -0.038 -0.138*** 0.643*** -0.053*
(0.033) (0.013) (0.029) (0.033) (0.013) (0.030)
Sum of Concurrent -0.035 -0.059*** -0.103*** -0.020 -0.110*** -0.308***
Project Costs (0.033) (0.013) (0.028) (0.036) (0.014) (0.031)
% Bidder Utilization 0.005 0.572*** 7.738*** 0.034 0.439*** 5.659***
(0.128) (0.052) (0.327) (0.132) (0.052) (0.359)
(% Bidder Utilization)2 -7.191*** -5.200***
(0.380) (0.414)
% FDOT Utilization -0.724*** -0.032 -0.176*** -0.730*** 0.007 0.015
(0.131) (0.053) (0.111) (0.131) (0.052) (0.118)
Log(Contract duration) 1.157*** -0.301*** -0.277 1.151*** -0.285*** -0.248***
(0.098) (0.053) (0.084) (0.098) (0.039) (0.089)
Close Project 0.074 0.015** 0.478*** -0.079 0.012 0.505
(0.098) (0.040) (0.098) (0.098) (0.039) (0.102)
# Proj. Entered -0.021 0.124*** 0.567***
(0.027) (0.011) (0.032)
# Proj. Won 0.009 -0.123** -0.529***
(0.027) (0.007) (0.032)
Engineer’s cost estimate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Type Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Square 0.516 0.574 0.516 0.588
N 4,137 4,137 4,137 4,137 4,137 4,137
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